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Abstract
In this chapter, we review the recent and growing literature on medium-term growth
patterns. This strand of research emerged from the realization that for most countries
economic development is a highly unstable process; over a few decades, a typical coun-
try enjoys periods of rapid growth as well episodes of stagnation and economic decline.
This approach highlights the complex nature of growth and implies that studying tran-
sitions between periods of fast growth, stagnation, and collapse is essential for under-
standing the process of long-run growth. We document recent efforts to characterize
and study such growth transitions. We also update and extend some of our earlier
research. Specifically, we use historical data from Maddison to confirm a link between
political institutions and propensity to experience large swings in growth. We also
study the role of institutions and macroeconomic policies, such as inflation, openness
to trade, size of government, and real exchange rate overvaluation, in the context of
growth transitions. We find surprisingly complex effects of some policies. For example,
openness to trade makes fast growth more likely but also increase the frequency of
crises. The size of government reduces the likelihood of fast miracle-like growth while
at the same time limiting the risk of stagnation. Moreover, these effects are nonlinear
and dependent on the quality of institutions. We conclude by highlighting potentially
promising areas for future research.
∗This paper will appear as a chapter in the Frontiers of Economics and Globalization, Series ed. Olivier
de La Grandville; foreword by Robert E. Solow. Emerald 2011.
†mjerzma@clemson.edu
‡cuberes@merlin.fae.ua.es
1
21 Introduction
The revival of research on economic growth that began in the last decades of the 20th
century was spurred on by both theoretical and empirical contributions. On the theoretical
front the papers by Romer (1986, 1990), Lucas (1988), and later Grossman and Helpman
(1991), and Aghion and Howitt (1992) provided new ways of modeling endogenous growth
and technological progress. On the empirical side, the availability of a large cross-country
data set, the Penn World Tables, and early papers exploiting it (Mankiw et al. 1992, Barro
and Sala-i-Martin 1991) gave impetus for researchers to test old and new theories of growth
against the facts.
Following the early contributions (Barro, 1991; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992 ) most
researchers adopted the approach of using long run, 20 years or more, averages of growth of
GDP per capita (or per worker) as the variable to be explained in the empirical analysis.
There is enormous variation in long-run growth rates. For example, Jordan’s income per
capita increased by only 30% between 1970 and 2000, while that of Singapore increased
7-fold. In much of the growth literature of the last two decades, researchers tried to explain
such difference by looking for factors – openness to trade, protection of property rights, high
investment rates, etc. – that are necessary for growth and which Jordan lacks while Singapore
has in abundance. This literature has delivered many important insights but has also come
under severe criticism for difficulties with establishing causality and the lack of robustness
of many results (for example, the effect of trade on growth). However, there is another
reason why the overall balance of this empirical approach is quite disappointing. While
focusing on explaining long-run average growth rates is a sensible starting point, when one
wants to isolate long-run tendencies from higher frequency phenomena such as business cycle
fluctuations, it also removes the information about how economic growth changed within a
country over time. This would not be a significant loss if countries behaved like in the growth
models where economies approach balanced growth paths in a smooth monotonic fashion.
Unfortunately, most countries’ growth experiences are far from smooth; they often experience
long stretches of moderate growth interrupted by 5 or 10 year periods of rapid development
only to later fall victim to decades of stagnation or years of decline. Long term averages
remove these patterns and preclude us from using this variation to learn about the nature of
the process of economic growth. Lant Pritchett, a leading development economist, has been
one of the first to point out the disconnect between the prevailing empirical approach and
reality of economic growth. In one of the papers (Pritchett 2000), he writes:
The historical path of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in the United
States is, except for the interlude of the Great Depression, well characterized
by reasonably stable exponential trend growth with modest cyclical deviations:
graphically, it is a modestly sloping, slightly bumpy hill. However, almost nothing
that is true of U.S. GDP per capita (or that of other countries of the Organization
for Economic Co-operation and Development) is true of the growth experience of
developing countries. A single time trend does not adequately characterize the
evolution of GDP per capita in most developing countries. Instability in growth
rates over time for a single country is great, relative to both the average level of
growth and the variance across countries.
3These observations led Pritchett to list the fact that “Growth has been enormously vari-
able within developing countries, and there is little persistence of economic growth rates”as
one of his seven stylized facts of the international growth experience. To make things con-
crete, consider Jordan and Singapore again. Their growth paths are plotted in Figure 22. It
is apparent that the performance of the two countries is radically different, with Singapore
experiencing a spectacular period of rapid growth, and Jordan suffering a dramatic stagna-
tion. However, when inspecting Jordan’s growth in greater detail, as is done in Figure 23, it
becomes apparent that the forty years of its economic history are more than just a period
of uninterrupted stagnation. The years 1960-75, and even more so the periods 1985-90 and
1995-2000 have been relatively successful while the years 1975-1985 and 1990-95 brought a
substantial decline in income level. As it turns out, Jordan did not perpetually stagnate but
instead had periods of rapid growth and also of dramatic decline; its economic growth seems
to wax and wane. Explaining such medium-term cycles in economic performance seems
key to understanding long-run economic growth and discovering the right set of policies for
development and stability.
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Figure 1: Relative growth performance of Singapore and Jordan, 1960-2000. Initial GDP
per capita normalized to 100.
To see even more directly how average growth studies can be misleading consider Figure
24, which illustrates the paths of output per worker in three countries, the Republic of Congo,
Gabon, and Portugal, over the period 1960-1995. The values have been normalized to equal
one at the beginning of the period. The growth experiences of these three countries differ
vastly: Portugal experienced a period of rapid growth followed by a mild slowdown and a
return to relatively rapid growth, Congo went through a long period of rapid growth and
then a period of equally rapid decline. Finally, Gabon grew faster than the two remaining
countries until the late 1970s but stagnated after that. Yet after 40 years all three countries
have grown by a surprisingly similar amount, roughly tripling their GDP per capita. If
we look at average performance only, we will conclude that Congo, Gabon, and Portugal’s
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Figure 2: Jordan’s growth performance 1960-2000. Initial GDP per capita normalized to
100.
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Figure 3: Different growth paths lead to similar average outcomes; Democratic Rep. of
Congo, Gabon, and Portugal.
5growth looks the same.
Why is understanding these patterns important? As a number of the papers described in
this chapter emphasize, starting rapid growth and sustaining it are two different phenomena.
We do not yet understand either of them very well. For example, increases in the variables
usually found to be strongly correlated with average long-run growth, such as investment
rates or trade openness, do not seem to initiate accelerations of economic growth. This
suggests that what the standard literature identifies as correlates of growth may not be the
factors that are needed to ignite it.
This chapter is an overview of the recent literature which studies the within-country
growth patterns and tries to, among other things, learn about the nature of the growth pro-
cess from analyzing differences in growth patterns such as those in Figure 24. This approach
highlights the complex nature of growth and implies that studying “growth transitions”, i.e.
switches between periods of fast growth, stagnation, and collapse is essential for understand-
ing the process of long-run growth. We begin by discussing early research that emphasized
the lack of persistence of growth and the diversity of growth experiences among developing
countries. We then summarize a series of more recent papers that look at growth transitions.
Here we extend one of our earlier contributions to look at growth transitions going back to
the late 19th century. We also discuss the idea of modeling growth in a non-linear structure
of multiple growth regimes and transitions between them. Here too, we extend our earlier
work by studying the role of macroeconomic policies in shaping growth patterns. We con-
clude by highlighting the achievements of the literature so far and pointing to potentially
fruitful avenues for future research.
2 Lack of Growth Persistence
The traditional analysis of growth assumes that there exist specific characteristics of countries
which are conducive to development. They either affect the growth rate of the economy
along a balanced growth path (BGP) or the level of the BGP or both. Among such factors
suggested by theory and explored empirically are investment rates, population growth rates,
quality of institutions, development of financial markets, quality of macroeconomic policies,
openness to trade, and many more. To keep our discussion general, we will refer to any
such growth-enhancing factor as X. An increase in X will, therefore, shift the BGP up or
increase its slope. In either case, a monotonic convergence to the new BGP follows. Once
on the BGP, of course, the economy will grow at a constant rate. It is instructive to start by
asking why, in this framework, would the growth rate of an economy change? Most models
predict that if a country is not on its BGP but is approaching it from below, growth will fall
monotonically. Similarly, if a country is above the BGP growth will increase monotonically.
Both of these possibilities suggest smoothly evolving growth and a reasonably large degree
of persistence of growth rates. Leaving aside, for now, the possibility of frequent shocks
that move the economy away from the BGP, the only way to get growth to change non-
monotonically is to have changes in X, i.e., to have changes that affect the BGP. If the
variable X, which determines the position and slope of the BGP jumps around a lot, so will
growth. Conversely, if X is reasonably stable, we would expect growth rates to be stable,
too. However, they are not. One of the first papers to draw attention to the variability of
6the growth process was Easterly et al. (1993). Specifically, they computed the correlation
of growth rates across decades (e.g., 1960-70 and 1970-80) as well as longer time periods
(20 and 30 years) in a sample of Penn World Table countries and found it to be quite low:
depending on sample and period the correlation coefficient was around 0.2-0.3. That is,
countries that developed rapidly in one decade are unlikely to be found in the group of fast
growers in the following ten years and conversely, slow growers are likely to pick up speed.
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Figure 4: Lack of growth persistence. Growth in GDP per capita 1985-95 versus 1995-2005.
Here we re-do the same exercise using more recent data. In Figure 25 we plot the average
growth of GDP per worker between 1985 and 1995 on the horizontal axis against the average
growth in the following decade using 150 countries in the PWT 6.3 data set. Just like
Easterly and his coauthors, we find very little persistence; the correlation coefficient is only
0.3.1 In Table 11 we report the results of regressing growth in a given decade on growth in
the previous one. While the relationship is positive (although not always significant), the
explanatory power of the regression never exceeds 11%.
Perhaps then the growth determinants – the X’s which much of the empirical growth
literature sought to identify – vary over time. Easterly et al. consider this possibility but as
they point out most growth determinants suggested by theory are very persistent: investment
rates, trade openness, and even government policies do not vary much from decade to decade.
In fact, one of the most robust correlates of development is the quality of institutions, a
characteristic which is usually thought to be a deep-rooted and very slow-moving variable.
This leaves the possibility that the growth rates we observe are just a consequence of ran-
dom shocks pushing countries out of steady states and the transitional dynamics that follows
1It is even lower when we keep two outliers: Liberia (whose output declined by an average 22% per year
between 1985 and 1995) and Equatorial Guinea (whose output increased by 28% annually during the decade
following 1995.)
71995-2005 1985-1995 1975-1985
Growth in Previous Decade 0.226 0.326 0.121
(0.059) (0.075) (0.109)
Constant 0.012 0.004 0.006
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
R-squared 0.086 0.110 0.002
Obs. 150 146 112
Table 1: Update on Easterly et al (1993). Growth over a decade regressed on growth during
previous decade.
such shocks. However, Pritchett(2000) looks more closely at growth in developing countries
and concludes that a complex set of growth patterns can indeed be identified. These patterns
often do not resemble a shock-and-monotonic-transition-back-to-BGP scenario. Pritchett
writes “[S]hifts in growth rates lead to distinct patterns. While some countries have steady
growth (hills and steep hills), others have rapid growth followed by stagnation (plateaus),
rapid growth followed by a decline (mountains) or even catastrophic falls (cliffs), continuous
stagnation (plains), or steady decline (valleys).” He concludes that the empirics of growth
should focus on identifying factors that initiate and stop growth, instead of analyzing what
explains average growth.
3 Growth Transitions
Following the contributions by Easterly et al. (1993) and Pritchett (1998) several recent
papers have focused attention on growth transitions, i.e., points in time when a substantial
shift in growth occurs, such as an acceleration when the rate of expansion of GDP per capita
suddenly picks up significantly for an extended period. The main focus of these papers is
to identify such turning points.2 The common finding in all of these papers is that such
large growth changes are a common phenomenon in both rich and developing countries.
In particular, growth accelerations – defined in one paper as periods of rapid growth over
3.5 % per year (but usually much higher) – are quite common even among countries that
are regarded as unsuccessful developers. That is, now and then even poor countries grow
rapidly for a significant time. One of the key conclusions from this research is that igniting
2In this chapter, we focus on papers employing statistical methods to detect and analyze growth transi-
tions. Another approach is to look at case studies, that is analyze the development history of a single country
at a time with close attention to economic, political, and social changes. While important, this approach
offers a limited possibility for generalization of results, and we view it as complementary to the systematic
statistical approach. See the volume edited by Dani Rodrik (2003).
8rapid growth and sustaining it are two very different enterprises and that the latter seems
much more difficult (see Rodrik 2005). This is an important finding for policymakers but
also for the field of economic growth because it casts doubt on the applicability of standard
growth models to the question of economic development. The obvious next step in this
literature is to determine what forces lead to growth accelerations and how they can be
sustained. Here the literature has been less successful. Each of the contributions described
below attempts to shed some light on the causes of growth transitions, but our understanding
of this phenomenon is still limited.
Hausmann et al. (2005) are the first to develop a formal methodology for identifying
growth accelerations. They define “growth acceleration” as an episode satisfying three cri-
teria: (1) growth of GDP per capita exceeds 3.5% per year, (2) the increase in growth rate
exceeds 2 percentage points, and (3) after 7 years output per capita exceeds the highest level
attained prior to the episode. They use a spline regression to identify such episodes in a
large sample of countries between 1950 and 2000. To their surprise, they find a great many
accelerations; there are a total of 83 accelerations in their sample during the 36 years where
their methodology allowed for accelerations to occur. This implies that an average country
would have about a 25 % chance of experiencing a growth acceleration per decade. In fact,
60% of the countries in the sample had at least one episode of acceleration, and 23% had
at least two. The accelerations were also significant in magnitude with an average of 4.7
percentage points increase in growth. Hausmann and co-authors also investigate the causes
of growth accelerations. They run a probit where the dependent variable is a dummy that
takes the value of 1 around the time of a growth acceleration and 0 otherwise. The list of
covariates in their regressions includes a terms-of-trade shock, political regime change, and
economic liberalization. They find many results consistent with the conventional wisdom
in the growth literature: episodes of financial liberalization are positively correlated with
the probability of experiencing a growth acceleration, economic reforms help produce more
sustained accelerations, while shocks tend to produce short-lived growth. Additionally, they
find that the negative impact of a movement towards autocracy is much larger than the pos-
itive impact of a movement towards democracy. However, many growth accelerations do not
appear to be spurred by any apparent changes in standard growth determinants and, equally
interestingly, many instances of reform fail to produce fast growth. As the authors empha-
size, growth accelerations are surprisingly hard to explain, i.e., even if some of the variables
have a statistically significant effect, the overall predictive power of these regressions remains
quite low.3
3de Haan, J., and Jong-A-Pin (2007) use a different indicator of growth accelerations and find that
they tend to be preceded by economic reforms and that they are more likely to take place after the start
of a new political regime. In a related paper, Jones and Olken (2005) study in more detail the impact
of the accidental death of a political leader on the subsequent growth performance of the country he was
ruling. They find robust evidence that the impact of the death of a leader, particularly in an autocracy,
has a positive and significant impact on growth. Imam and Salinas (2008) study growth accelerations in
Sub-Saharan Africa and find that they are mostly associated with external shocks, episodes of economic
liberalization, political stability, and geographical variables such as proximity to the coast. On the other
hand, high levels of corruption, as well as falling domestic credit, seem to be correlated with sharp growth
decelerations. Aizenman and Spiegel (2010) focus on take-off from stagnation to rapid growth (i.e., they
exclude accelerations from already rapid growth to even higher one) and explore, among other factors, the
9Jones and Olken (2008) extend the analysis of Hausmann et al. to include both accel-
erations and decelerations in growth episodes. They identify growth transitions using the
Bai-Perron test (Bai and Perron 1998).4 Their findings confirm that such episodes are fre-
quent for most rich and developing countries; they detect 73 structural breaks in 48 of the
125 countries with at least 20 years of Penn World Table data. Of these transitions, 43 are
“up-breaks” or accelerations, and 30 are “down-breaks” or collapses. The breaks identified
by the Bai-Perron test are large: the mean change in growth during a break is 6.8 percentage
points for “up-breaks” and - 6 percentage points for “down-breaks”. Since their test seems
to set the bar for identifying an acceleration higher, they find fewer of them than Hausmann
et al. (2005). To better understand the nature of growth transitions, Jones and Olken (2008)
look for significant changes in main macroeconomic variables and measures of institutions
around the time of the transition. First, they perform a standard growth decomposition
separating growth of GDP into that of physical capital and the residual (TFP) and find
an interesting asymmetry whereby accelerations are associated with rapid TFP growth but
not significantly faster capital accumulation. “Down-breaks” are associated with declines in
both TFP and capital accumulation. They fail to find any significant change in institutional
variables at the time of growth breaks. Of the macroeconomic variables, accelerations ap-
pear to be associated with a significant increase in trade (both imports and exports) while
collapses coincide with increases in nominal instability (increase in inflation and nominal
exchange rate depreciation).
In Cuberes and Jerzmanowski (2009), we follow a similar approach. We also start by
identifying and documenting structural breaks in the growth process using the Bai-Perron
approach in the following specification
yt = αn + gnt+ εt for tn < t ≤ tn+1, ∀t = 1, ...T, (1)
where yt represents the logarithm of real output per worker relative to the United States,
the variable t indexes time, while n indexes growth breaks, gn represents the trend growth
following n-th break, and εt is the error term. That is, each time a break occurs, there can
potentially be a change in the intercept parameter, the slop, or both. We focus our attention
on the changes in growth rate (slope parameter).
We use data on real output per worker from the Penn World Table (Heston et al., 2006)
for the period 1950-2000. We find a total of 208 breaks, which corresponds to 1.8 breaks per
country. Of these breaks, 49% represent increases in the growth rate. Figure 26 shows the
case of Argentina, where the Bai-Perron methodology finds two structural breaks. The first
break occurs around 1980, and it corresponds to a substantial decline in Argentina’s growth
rate, which moves from positive (catching up to the U.S.) to negative (falling behind it).
The second break occurs around 1990, and this time growth becomes less negative without
changing its sign. The graph also shows the confidence intervals of these estimated breaks.5
composition of the country’s output.
4See also Ben-David et al. (2003).
5One concern about the Bai-Perron test of structural breaks is that it relies on asymptotic properties.
10
Figure 5: Argentina’s log real output per worker relative to the US. The vertical dashed
lines indicate Bai-Perron break dates. The solid lines show the estimate of the trend part
of yt = αn + gnt. The figure also shows the confidence intervals around the estimated break
dates.
Next, we analyze the patterns in the trend-growth changes we have identified. We are
particularly interested in the link between political institutions and the magnitude of growth
swings. We are motivated by the strong evidence that democratic countries are less volatile
(Rodrik 2000, Quinn and Woolley 2001). This interesting correlation proved to be much
more robust than the democracy-growth relationship: while various studies find that the
effect of democracy on growth is rather weak (Przeworski and Limongi 1993, Barro and
Sala-i-Martin 2003), the link between a greater degree of democracy and lower economic
instability appears very robust. For example, Rodrik (1999) provides compelling evidence
that democratic countries experience less volatility. However, this literature usually measures
volatility using the standard deviation of annual growth rates. Having uncovered large and
frequent medium-term swings in growth, we investigate whether this sort of lower frequency
volatility is also related to political institutions. In particular, we estimate: (i) how the
magnitude of trend-growth changes varies with the degree of the country’s democracy, and
(ii) whether democracy affects the likelihood of experiencing large trend-growth swings.
To analyze the dynamics of growth transitions we estimate the following regression
gin = β0 + β1gin−1 + εin, (2)
where gin represents the growth rate in country i after break n estimated from (1). We
Since we use relatively short time series throughout the analysis, one may be concerned about inference
based on asymptotic results. To check the robustness of our break detection results, we employ a Bayesian
approach based on Wang and Zivot (2000) to estimate these breaks and compare our results with the ones
obtained using the Bai-Perron method. Our comparison focuses on the years at which breaks occur with
each method. The average difference (in absolute value) between the two estimates is 0.33 years, and its
standard deviation is 3.23. In 67% of the cases, the break dates are identical, and the difference is no larger
than 5 years 92% of the time.
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are interested in the coefficient β1, i.e., the existence and direction of a relation between
pre-break and post-break growth rates. Depending on the value of the β1 parameter, we
can have three interesting cases. First, if βˆ1 = 0 then, on average, the growth rate before a
break does not help predict the growth rate after it. If βˆ1 ∈ (0, 1) then there is monotonic
convergence in growth rates. This is a reversion-to-the-mean dynamic; i.e., exceptionally fast
growers before the break still grow fast after the break, just slightly less so; in the long run,
there is convergence to the BGP. Figure 27(a) illustrates the dynamics of this system for the
case where initial growth is above the long-run equilibrium value. When interpreting the
figure, recall that “periods” here are not calendar years but break dates. Thus growth may
remain constant for a long time, but when a break occurs, the adjustment is as illustrated in
the figure. Figure 27(b) shows the case in which βˆ1 ∈ (−1, 0) and so growth fluctuates from
above and below the BGP during its transition, in other words, the process is characterized
by growth cycles or reversals.
(a) Monotonic Convergence (b) Cycling
Figure 6: Panel (a): Monotonic convergence in growth rates (βˆ1 ∈ (0, 1)). Panel (b): Growth
reversals (βˆ1 ∈ (−1, 0)).
To see if the degree of democracy affect the dynamics of growth transition we split
the sample into high and low democracy groups and estimate equation (7).6 We use the
variable polity2 from the dataset POLITY IV (Marshall and Jaggers, 2002) as our measure
of democracy.7 As additional covariates in the estimated version of (7) we also include
the level of democracy and the log of initial income (to capture the standard convergence
dynamics) and decade dummies. We use alternative panel data estimators, but in Table 12
we only report the estimates obtained using the dynamic Arellano-Bond estimator. While
among the democratic countries we find no significant relationship between the pre and
6In Cuberes and Jerzmanowski (2009) we use an interaction term to avoid picking an arbitrary cut-off
level of democracy to split the sample.
7polity2 is an average of autocracy and democracy scores. It ranges from -10 to 10 (-10 = high autocracy;
10 = high democracy) and includes specific indexes meant to capture constraints on the executive, the degree
of political competition, the legislature effectiveness, etc.
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post break growth rates (β1 ≈ 0), in the less democratic sample we see evidence of growth
reversals (β1 < 0). That is, periods of exceptionally high growth are, on average, followed
by periods of exceptionally low growth, and vice versa. Growth rates in less democratic
economies are not monotone; rather, they cycle between high and low (or even negative)
values as in Figure 27(b). Interestingly, the income level does not affect the propensity to
experience growth reversals.
Low Democracy High Democracy
Growth before Break -0.374** 0.083
(0.146) (0.202)
Initial Income -0.074** -0.069***
(0.036) (0.018)
Democracy 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
Constant -0.006 0.003
(0.005) (0.005)
Obs. 84 49
Table 2: Penn World Table data. Arellano-Bond.* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Using a probit and linear probability models, we also find that the propensity to expe-
rience substantial swings of trend-growth is not uniform across countries – less democratic
countries are more susceptible to it. When compared with factors commonly associated with
volatility, such as measures of quality of institutions, macroeconomic policies, and financial
development, as well as income level, we find that democracy is the most robust predictor
of a country’s propensity for growth reversals. Finally, we test whether our results can be
explained by the fact that countries which rely heavily on natural resources tend to be less
democratic and also exposed to large shocks (in the form of large swings of world prices of
the resources they export). While shocks to prices of natural resources appear to contribute
to the propensity for growth reversals, they do not account for the effect of democracy.8
8One may think that greater growth variability in less democratic countries is a reflection of more frequent
regime changes: i.e., whenever a ruler changes there is an abrupt change in growth. While Jones and Olken’s
(2005) result suggest leaders do matter for growth in less democratic countries, the average time between
breaks is usually shorter than many autocrats’ tenure. Easterly (2011) studies this question directly and
concludes that growth is equally variable within autocrats’ tenure as between them.
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In the above analysis, we use data on output per worker from the Penn World Table
covering, for most countries, the period 1960-2000. Here, in order to explore the presence
and dynamics of growth transitions in a longer time series, we extend our analysis to the
historical figures on output per capita from Maddison (1995, 2001) which covers the period
1870-1994.9 We again use the Bai-Perron test for structural breaks and we exploit the same
measures of democracy.10 We find that during this period the average number of breaks per
country in the Maddison sample is around 4. In 48% of the cases these breaks represent an
increase in growth. The lowest number of breaks per country is 2, and the largest is 8. Figure
28 presents an histogram of the changes in growth rates at the time of the structural break.
Since in the Maddison data the number of countries with available information on income
changes significantly over time, going from 14 countries in the 1870s to 29 in the 1920s and
to 54 from the 1960s on, we divide the number of breaks by the number of countries in each
year to better assess the relative frequency of breaks.
Figure 7: Frequency of growth breaks in the Maddison data set.
The first observation is that the frequency of breaks does not show a very clear trend if
one considers the entire period. The incidence of breaks was quite high in the 1880s, and in
9The 112 countries in Maddison’s unbalanced panel are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Cote d’Ivoire, Congo Rep., Czech Republic,
Denmark, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland,
Italy, Japan, Kenya, Korea Rep., Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan,
Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan,
Tanzania, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia.
10Using the Bayesian methodology of Wang and Zivot (2001), we get similar results.
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most cases, they represented sudden increases in growth. After that decade, the frequency of
breaks decreased and then rose again until the 1920s. The vast majority of structural breaks
that we detect in the 1930s were negative, indicating the economic turbulence of the Great
Depression. The opposite happens in the aftermath of WW2 (the 1940s), a period of very
frequent growth accelerations that reflect the economic recovery in many of the countries
in our sample. The number of breaks dropped drastically in the 1950s and rose again in
the last three decades of the studied period. It is noticeable that in these decades growth
decelerations were more common than accelerations. The key conclusion we draw from this
exercise is that the phenomenon of growth transitions is not unique to the modern period
studied by most papers in this literature.
Next, we ask whether, as was the case in the modern period PWT data, there is a
tendency for less democratic countries to experience larger growth swings. As we did in
Cuberes and Jerzmanowski (2009), we split countries into two groups: those with high
democracy and those with low democratic scores. 11 We then estimate an equation (7)
including as regressors initial income, the initial level of democracy, and time dummies for
each decade. Table ?? displays the results obtained using the fixed effects estimator.
All Coutries High Democracy Low Democracies
Growth before Break -0.307*** -0.157 -0.223 0.174 -0.388*** -0.468***
(0.095) (0.1) (0.148) (0.157) (0.113) (0.134)
Initial Income -0.029 -0.075*** -0.033 -0.109*** -0.048*** -0.062***
(0.018) (0.023) (0.027) (0.038) (0.015) (0.017)
Democracy 0.000 -0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Obs. 130 85 74 46 56 39
Table 3: Growth Reversals in Maddison data; Arellano-Bond. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05,
***p < 0.01.
In the entire sample there is evidence of growth reversals even after controlling for initial
income (column 2), although it is not statistically significant once one includes initial democ-
racy as an additional control (column 3). Columns 4 and 5 show that democratic countries
exhibit no cycling. The coefficient associated with growth before the break is not significant
11In both cases, the cut-off here is chosen to be the median value of polity2 in the sample, i.e. countries
with a democracy score equal or larger than this threshold are labeled ”high democracies,” and below it,
they are considered ”low democracies. Alternative cutoffs deliver very similar results.
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and it even turns positive. On the other hand, non-democracies experience growth reversals.
Columns 6 and 7 show that, in these countries, even after including democracy as an ex-
planatory variable, periods of rapid growth are followed by periods of much slower growth,
and vice versa. This is very much consistent with the results obtained using the PWT data
for the period 1950-2000.12
The above exercise gives us further confidence in the phenomenon of growth reversals
first described in Cuberes and Jerzmanowski (2009). Of course, the natural question to ask
is why less democratic institutions lead to larger growth swings? We hypothesize, following
arguments made by Acemoglu (2008) and Aghion et al. (2007), that less democracy implies
larger barriers to entry for firms and thus a larger degree of concentration in production.
With less diversification comes the potential for larger growth swings. Using data on man-
ufacturing concentration from the U.N’s Industrial Statistics Database (revision 2), we find
support for this argument. Specifically, we first calculate the Herfindahl-Hirschmann index
of concentration for the manufacturing industry in each of the 181 countries in our sample
during the period 1963-2003.13 We then regress this index against the POLITY IV measure
of democracy as well as per capita GDP and its square. Table 14 shows that the coefficient
on democracy is negative and significant at conventional levels, indicating that the manufac-
turing sector is indeed less concentrated in more democratic countries, even after controlling
for income effects.
Another reason less democratic countries may experience growth reversals is due to social
conflict. For example, Rodrik (1999) shows that the growth slowdowns of the 1970s were
larger in less democratic and more ethnolinguistically fictionalized countries. He argues that
both of these characteristics lead to more internal conflict because there are more groups in
the society who may have opposing interests, and the lack of democracy prevents peaceful
resolution of disputes among them. It is plausible that a mechanism like this could lead
to growth reversals. In early stages of rapid growth, its benefits are usually distributed
unevenly among the various groups in the society (workers vs. capital owners, exporters
vs. import-competing producers, educated vs. uneducated workers, etc.). If the rising
income inequality leads to social tension and conflict, and there are not peaceful resolution
mechanisms, internal turmoil and a growth collapse may be a direct consequence of the
preceding rapid growth. But there has been no formal test of this hypothesis
An interesting alternative explanation for growth reversals has recently been suggested
by Boucekkine and Pintus (2011). They develop an AK model of a small open economy with
borrowing constraints that allows for both leapfrogging and growth reversals. In their model,
economies have access to the international capital market, but there exists a borrowing limit
determined by the amount of available collateral. The novel element comes for the fact that,
if it is not possible for the borrower to commit to a future investment plan, the lender uses
the borrower’s past stock of capital as collateral. This assumption leads to interesting history
12It is also noticeable that in all cases, richer countries tend to experience more slow growth in the next
regime, indicating some degree of neoclassical convergence. The initial level of democracy, on the other hand,
is uncorrelated with future rates of growth.
13The dataset contains information on 29 manufacturing categories at the 3-digit level of disaggregation.
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Value Added Output Value Added Output
Democracy -0.159*** -0.166*** -0.111*† -0.121**
(0.052) (0.048) (0.070) (0.061)
GDP p.c. -0.386 -0.623**
(0.269) (0.263)
GDP p.c. Squared 0.019 0.034**
(0.018) (0.017)
Constant 2.880*** 2.739*** 4.629*** 5.402***
(0.136) (0.127) (1.060) (1.037)
R2 0.072 0.084 0.109 0.127
Obs. 2695 2623 2649 2591
Table 4: Democracy and Industrial Concentration. Pooled OLS regression of the Herfindahl-
Hirschman index in manufacturing on democracy, GDP per capita, and GDP per capita
squared. Standard errors clustered by country. *† < 0.12, *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p <
0.01.
dependence: the BGP of the economy depends not only on the initial level of capital but also
on its past growth path. This dependence of the borrowing limit on a lagged capital stock
is also key to generating growth reversals and/or leapfrogging. If the delay – the number of
periods before the borrowing date that the lender takes into account as collateral – is short,
then history does not matter much. Therefore, a rich country that had a recent slow growth
will receive a low amount of credit, and therefore, it will grow slowly in the future. So, in
this case, there will be leapfrogging and no growth reversals (a country that had performed
poorly will continue to do so in the future). Growth reversals (instances when growth goes
from above BGP value to below it) are also possible. They occur when a fast-growing country
faces the borrowing constraint with a sufficiently long lag. Since its capital stock was low
in the past, its current debt limit is low, and the lack of foreign capital inflow leads to a
growth slowdown. There is also an intermediate case where both leapfrogging and growth
reversals are possible. The authors argue that under reasonable parameter values, the model
is able to replicate characteristics of growth reversals reported in Cuberes and Jerzmanowski
(2009). The paper by Boucekkine and Pintus is especially noteworthy because it represents
one of the first attempts to construct a theory of growth transitions.14
Finally, we should note that the theories of poverty traps would appear to be natural
explanations for growth transitions. After all, most such models predict a long period of
stagnation or slow growth (poverty trap) and a sudden acceleration of growth once the
14Aghion et al. (2004) are motivated by more high-frequency volatility but their model, in which periods
of economic boom put upward pressure on the price of the scarce domestic factor of production which leads
to a slowdown, suggest another interesting mechanism for generating growth reversals.
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economy escapes the trap. However, most of these theories also imply that the escape from
the trap is once and for all. Easterly (2006) uses the Bai-Perron test to identify episodes
of permanent growth take-off, i.e., growth permanently transiting from zero to a positive
value, which he interprets as evidence of emergence from a poverty trap. He finds very few
such episodes. This is consistent with our findings that growth accelerations, especially in
non-democratic countries, are ultimately reversed.
One conclusion reiterated in the papers discussed above is that initiating growth and
sustaining it require different policies and/or environments. For example, Hausmann et al.
(2005) show that standard economic and political fundamentals (economic reform, political
regime change, terms of trade shocks, etc.) do rather poorly at explaining the timing of
growth accelerations. A paper by Berg et al. (2008) asks a very natural complementary
question: what is the role of standard growth determinants in sustaining growth? Of course,
knowing what makes growth sustained is key for policymakers in developing world, perhaps
more important than knowing how to start it since accelerations happen quite often (even
if we don’t fully understand why). To investigate the duration of growth spells Berg and
coauthors estimate a proportional hazard model using a host of potential determinants in-
cluding shocks (world interest rate, terms of trade), institutions, macroeconomic stability,
social and economic homogeneity, human capital, and trade and financial openness (includ-
ing structure of exports and capital inflows). Where appropriate and possible, the authors
include the initial level as well as the change during the spell for the explanatory variables.
To measure growth spell duration, they use a combination of the Hausmann et al. (2005),
and Jones and Olken (2008) approaches to dating growth accelerations. Specifically, the
authors focus their attention on episodes of growth acceleration to above 2% followed by
deceleration to below 2% (complete spells) or end of sample (incomplete spells). Among
their findings, they report that democracy, income equality, macroeconomic stability as well
as export orientation (including propensity to export manufactures, openness to FDI, and
avoidance of exchange rate overvaluation) all help sustain growth spells. Perhaps surpris-
ingly, violent conflict doesn’t appear to matter. Conditional on the covariates the authors
usually find positive but often not significant duration dependence.15
4 Growth Regimes
Just as averaging growth over long periods of time masks the diverse experience of growth
accelerations and collapses, the binary classification of a growth transition (acceleration ver-
sus its absence) removes some important variation across countries and time. In fact, in
Pritchett’s analysis cited above he distinguished multiple growth patterns, of which accel-
erations (and collapses) were just one example. In another paper, Pritchett (2003) suggest
that an appropriate way to think about growth is to imagine that there exist multiple growth
states, or regimes, each of which represents a distinct growth behavior.
Pritchett illustrates his idea with a simulation of a simple model with four states: a
stagnation state with constant growth of 0.5 %, a convergence state with rapid growth, an
implosion state with negative growth, and a state of steady growth at 1.8 %. He assumes that
15See also Johnson et al. (2007).
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the state characteristics (growth rates in each state) and that transition probabilistically are
constant and identical for all developing countries. He then calibrates the transition matrix in
so that the world economy with 103 developing countries and 14 developed countries (which
are restricted to always be in the steady growth regime) matches the observed dispersion of
GDP per capita in 1995. His main message is that a model of this kind has the potential
to generate a wide range of growth patterns among developing countries as well as account
for low persistence of growth discussed above. Notice that in this model, it is only the
randomness of the (common) transition dynamics that generates the diversity of growth
patterns across developing countries. However, in practice, there is no particular reason to
think that transition probabilities are the same for all countries. The idea that country-
specific characteristics affect growth by determining transition probabilities leads to some
interesting possibilities.
To illustrate the idea, consider the following simple example. Suppose that there are
only two possible states of the world - one in which the economy stagnates and another in
which it grows at 3% per year. If over time a country switches between regimes, growth will
be an uneven process. This is, of course, what growth looks like for many countries. For
example, Japan accelerated in the 1950s and ’60s and then stagnated in the 1990s, while
India grew slowly until it took off in the 1990s. If we further assume that these transition
probabilities themselves depend on some country-specific characteristic X (e.g., quality of
institutions), we have a model where country characteristics, such as policies or institutional
quality, shape long-run growth by affecting the frequency of the two regimes.
Within a standard approach to growth, if a characteristic X is “good” for growth then
countries with a high level of X are expected to be growing fast (say, at 3% per year)
and countries with low levels of X are expected, all else equal, to be growing slowly (say,
stagnate); this is a world where “you either have what it takes for growth, or you don’t”.
In the regimes approach it becomes possible for country characteristics to be favorable to
growth by affecting the transition probabilities; good X means more frequent episodes of
growth, but it is possible for a high-X country to stagnate just as it is possible for the low-X
country to grow from time to time. A stylized illustration of the switching process of growth
for two countries is presented below in Figure 29.
Country 1 has a lower level of the growth-conducive characteristic X, and so it spends
more time in the stagnation regime. However, it is capable of periods of fast growth. In fact,
when it is growing, it grows as fast as country 2. Of course, country two with high X visits
the growth regime more frequently, and so, in the long run, it will grow faster. However, it
too stagnates from time to time. What determines the long run growth performance of an
economy is the within-regime dynamics (3% vs. 0), and the frequency of visits to the two
growth regimes. The growth regimes approach calls for identifying the regimes as well as the
properties of transitions, including the set of X’s which may include present-day economic
and political characteristics of the country, regional or world variables, the country’s history,
etc.
Jerzmanowski (2005) estimates a model where transition probabilities are allowed to
differ across countries, as was the case in the example of Figure 29. He builds on Pritchett’s
insights and applies the framework of Markov-switching regression to identify the regimes.
Assuming that there are four regimes, each with a distinct AR(1) growth process leads to
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Figure 8: A stylized illustration of the switching process of growth. Some country-specific
characteristic X makes the growth regime more likely (e.g., good institutions). Country one
has a low value of X, and so it spends more time in the stagnation regime. However, it
is capable of periods of fast growth. Country two has high X, and so it visits the growth
regime more frequently. However, it too stagnates from time to time.
the following model16
yˆit = αst + βst yˆit−1 + ε
st
it , (3a)
εstit ∼ i.i.d.N(0, σ
2
st
), (3b)
where yˆt i is the growth rate of country i in period t and st indicates the regime that is
in effect at time t, that is for every t, st ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}.
The growth process is fully characterized by the above within regime dynamics (8) and
the evolution of regimes, which is assumed to follow a 4-state Markov process where the
transition probabilities are allowed to depend on the country’s quality of institutions. That is,
P{sit = k | sit−1 = j} ≡ pjk = pjk(zi) for j, k = 1, ..., 4, where zi is a measure of the quality of
institutions in country i. Thus unlike in Pritchett’s simple simulation, transition probabilities
are country specific. This model is estimated using maximum likelihood (see Jerzmanowski
(2005) a for details). The resulting estimates consist of the within-regime parameters (α’s,
16Unfortunately, the correct number of regimes cannot be tested with the simple likelihood ratio test. See
Hamilton (1994) for discussion and references. The informal procedure followed by Jerzmanowski (2005)
was to start with two regimes and increase the number of regimes as long as all estimated regimes appeared
distinct.
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β’s, and σ’s), the parameters of the transition matrix pjk(zi) for j, k = 1, ..., 4, and the
inference about regimes st for t=1,...T. We discuss them in turn.
Table 15 shows the parameter estimates. Each of the four AR(1) processes implies a
different long-run growth rate, i.e., the average growth rate that would obtain if the economy
were to remain in that regime indefinitely, given by α/(1−β) and shown in the last column.
Notice that these average long-run growth rates (from which we derive the regime labels)
do not fully characterize the regimes. In addition to the long run average performance,
regimes differ significantly in the volatility of growth (σ) and persistence of growth shocks
(β).17 The stable regime corresponds to the growth experience predominant among developed
economies, with a long-run average growth of about 2 percent. The volatility is relatively
low, and there is a great deal of persistence in the growth process. The stagnation regime
is characterized by no growth on average and larger volatility of growth shocks. In this
regime, periods of growth and decline occur but are not very persistent. The crisis regime
is an episode of large shocks to growth. While these shocks tend on average to be negative
reflecting economic crises, the dispersion is very large and positive shocks are also possible.
These shocks have no persistence. Finally, there exists the regime of fast, miracle-like growth
with a long run average growth of 6% and modest volatility.
Constant (αs) AR Coeff. (βs) Std. Dev.(σs) Long Run Growth
Stable Growth 0.0132∗∗ 0.3761∗∗ 2.11% 2.12%
Stagnation 0.0010 0.1799∗∗ 4.56% 0.12%
Crisis −0.0101∗∗ -0.0045 13.16% −1.00%
Miracle Growth 0.0536∗∗ 0.1417∗∗ 2.71% 6.25%
Table 5: Within regime estimates of yˆt i = αst + βst yˆt−1 i + ε
st
ti , and ε
st
ti ∼ i.i.d.N(0, σ
2
st
)
for each of the four states. The first column shows the constant term, the second is the
autoregressive coefficient and the third is the estimate of the standard deviation of the error
component. The last column shows the implied long run growth. A ∗ denotes significance
at 10% level, ∗∗ denotes significance at 5% level.
Figure 30 summarizes the estimates of transition matrices. Each of the four boxes plots
the probability of moving from a given state to each of the four states as a function of
the institutions index. For example, the upper left-hand side box shows the probability of
moving from the stable growth state to each of the four states. The solid line shows the
17Note that the within-regime persistence of the growth process β, say 0.3761 for the stable growth regime,
should not be confused with the persistence of the stable growth regime itself. The former is assumed to
be a property of the stable growth process common to all countries, whereas the latter depends on the
country-specific transition probabilities, which will be discussed below.
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probability of moving to the stable state (i.e., in this case remaining in the same state), the
dash-dot line shows the probability of moving to stagnation while the dashed and dotted
lines show the same for crisis and miracle regimes, respectively. The upper right-hand side
box shows the same set of plots conditional on the current state being stagnation and so on.
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Figure 9: Transition probabilities as a function of the quality of institutions. The upper
left-hand side box shows plots of the probability of moving from state one to each of the
four states. The solid line shows the probability of moving to state one (i.e., probability of
remaining in the same state), the dash-dot line shows the probability of moving to state two
while the dashed and dotted lines show the same for state three and four, respectively.
The stable growth regime is very persistent for all values of the institutions index, but
the persistence does increase with the quality of institutions. Stagnation is very persistent
for weak-institutions countries, but this persistence falls off markedly with the quality of
institutions above 0.6 (e.g., Turkey). For high quality of institutions countries, a period
of stagnation is more likely to be followed by a reversal to stable growth. The lower left-
hand side graph shows the probability of changing regimes conditional on the current state
being the growth shock (crisis) state. Finally, the lower right-hand side graph shows the
probability of changing regimes conditional on the current state being the fast growth state.
For low-quality countries, a period of fast growth is very likely followed by a growth shock
state. Intermediate quality countries are also not likely to remain in the growth regime for
long and most likely revert to stagnation. However for mid-to-high institutions countries the
22
fast growth regime is very persistent.
Figure 31 shows the plots of the ergodic distribution of states for different levels of insti-
tutional quality. The most important feature is that countries with low quality of institutions
spend about 60% of the time in stagnation, and only around 15-20% of the time growing at
positive and sustained but moderate rates. For values of the quality of institutions above
0.4, the time spent stagnating starts decreasing while the fraction of time spent growing
increases. However, the quality of institutions must be above 0.6 for stagnation to no longer
be the most frequent state. Improving institutions also increases the time spent growing fast
(Miracle Growth). For values of the index above 0.7 (e.g., Mauritius) more time is spent
growing fast than stagnating.
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Figure 10: Ergodic probabilities of the four regimes as functions of the quality of institutions.
These estimated transition probabilities imply that institutions are more important in
sustaining growth than in igniting it. In particular, low quality of institutions countries have
a significant probability of entering growth regimes, however, the probability of exit is high.
In the long run regimes follow an ergodic distribution where low quality of institutions leads
to frequent stagnation and crises whereas high quality, while not ruling out stagnation or
crises, reduces their frequency and increases that of the growth regimes.
These results suggest that randomness of the transition between regimes is not the only
factor accounting for differences in growth patterns across countries. In particular, the
quality of institutions, widely believed to be an important growth determinant, affect the
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transition dynamics. High quality of institutions, such as a strong rule of law and protection
of private property, increase the frequency of visits to favorable regimes but most importantly
make them more persistent; countries with weak institutions are capable of growth takeoffs,
however, they are unable to sustain them.
5 Policies, Institutions, and Regime Switching
Pritchett’s (2003) simple simulation illustrated that a model which includes multiple growth
regimes and random transitions between them can account for the large diversity of growth
patterns. Jerzmanowski (2005) extends this insight by explicitly estimating a regime-switching
growth model and allowing the transition probabilities to depend on the quality of the coun-
try’s institutions. This raises a natural question about what other country characteristics
influence the probability of transitions between regimes. In this section, we provide a novel
analysis of this question. We focus on the role of macroeconomic policies.
The question of whether macroeconomic policies such as inflation, government spending,
real exchange rate overvaluation, and trade openness matter for long-run economic growth
has a long history in empirical growth literature. Early research on determinants of growth
in a cross-section of countries found significant effects of macroeconomic policies on long-
run growth (e.g. Barro 1991, Dollar 1992, Sachs and Warner 1995). However, much of the
recent literature is more skeptical. Easterly and Levine (2003) argue that, after controlling for
institutions, policies do not affect the level of income. Easterly (2005) shows that the findings
of significant effects of policies on growth are driven by extreme outliers. Finally, Acemoglu
et al. (2003) argue that once institutions are controlled for, policies do not matter much
for growth and volatility. Here we re-examine the question of policies and growth, while
explicitly accounting for within-country variation in the growth process. This framework
is richer than the standard average growth analysis since it allows policies to work through
multiple channels by differentially affecting the likelihood of growth accelerations, stagnation,
and crisis. We use the regime probabilities obtained by Jerzmanowski (2005) to estimate
the effects of policies on the frequency of the four growth regimes. We ask whether some
policies are associated with a country spending more time in periods of growth, stagnation,
or crisis.
In order to study the joint effect of institutions and policies on growth through their
effect on regimes changes, one could follow the same approach as Jerzmanowski (2005) and
extend the vector z in the transition probabilities matrix p(z) to include measures of policy.
In practice, the estimation is quite computationally intensive, even with only one variable.
Instead, we use the inference about the likelihood of regimes obtained from the estimation
of the baseline model. The logic of the approach is as follows.
Since the true value of the regime is unobservable, we can never know with certainty
whether a given country is in any given state. However, conditional on the model, the
estimated parameters, and all the observations for a given country, we can form inference
about the probability of the regimes during the sample period. These smoothed probabilities,
denoted by Pˆ (st = j|YmT ), where YmT stands for the entire time series for country m, give
us an estimate of the likelihood of each of the four regimes for country m at all sample dates
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t. For example, Pˆ (s1979 = 1|YUS T ) tells us the (conditional) probability that the U.S. was in
the stable growth regime in 1979. Figures 32 and 33 plot examples of the smoothed regime
probabilities.
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Figure 12: Regime probabilities: Ghana
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Table 16 below presents the smoothed probabilities averaged over the sample period 1970-
94 for each of the regimes for a selected group of countries. That is, for each country the first
column gives the average probability of the stable growth regime (1/T )
∑T
l=1 Pˆ (sl = 1|YT ),
the second column gives the average probability of stagnation (1/T )
∑T
l=1 Pˆ (sl = 2|YT ), and
so on. These probabilities tell us what is the average (over sample years) probability that a
country was in a given regime. For example, on average the probability that Japan was in
the miracle growth regime is 33% while the average probability that it was stagnating is 5%.
country Stable Growth Stagnation Crisis Miracle Growth Avg. Growth
Hong Kong 0.04 0.17 0.06 0.72 5.56%
Japan 0.62 0.05 0.00 0.33 4.31%
Thailand 0.13 0.33 0.03 0.51 4.36%
Portugal 0.51 0.13 0.01 0.36 3.92%
Malaysia 0.31 0.24 0.03 0.42 3.48%
Egypt 0.50 0.40 0.05 0.06 2.20%
India 0.37 0.51 0.03 0.09 2.10%
USA 0.89 0.07 0.00 0.03 2.04%
Mexico 0.52 0.35 0.02 0.11 1.68%
Chile 0.05 0.45 0.16 0.34 1.64%
Zimbabwe 0.05 0.72 0.15 0.08 1.03%
New Zealand 0.74 0.21 0.01 0.04 0.90%
Bolivia 0.45 0.43 0.08 0.03 0.10%
Cote d’Ivoire 0.02 0.61 0.15 0.22 0.07%
Table 6: The columns report average smoothed probabilities of regimes, i.e. the estimates
of regimes’ likelihood based on the entire sample. Let Pˆ (st = 1|YT ), the smoothed in-
ference about the likelihood that regime one was in effect in period t. Column one is
(1/T )
∑T
l=1 Pˆ (sl = 1|YT ), column two is (1/T )
∑T
l=1 Pˆ (sl = 2|YT ) and so on.
We assume that the averages frequencies approximate the ergodic regime distribution
and use them to compute the average number of occurrences of each regime during the
sample period. We then ask how the country’s quality of institutions and macroeconomic
policies affect regime probabilities. In particular, we average the estimated probabilities
over two subperiods, 1970-82 and 1983-1994, and run a pooled multinomial logit. If, as was
assumed by Jerzmanowski (2005), quality of institutions is the only variable determining
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transition probabilities, we would expect to replicate the estimates of the relationship be-
tween the ergodic distribution of regimes and the institutional quality presented in Figure
31, with departures from this distribution being purely random and unrelated to policies.
Alternatively, if policies do matter, they will add additional explanatory power in fitting the
observed regime distributions.18
To determine the relationship between policies and institutions and regime frequencies
we estimate the following multinomial logit model.
Pr(regime = j)i =
exp(Xi βj)
∑4
s=1 exp(Xi βs)
, (4)
(5)
for j = 1, 2, 3,4. Pr(regime = j) is the average probability of regime j during the sample
periods, and Xi is a vector of country specific characteristics including initial income, quality
of institutions and four policy measures: log of average inflation, real exchange rate overval-
uation, the share of government’s consumption in GDP, and trade to GDP ratio. Quality
of institutions is measured using the rule of law index from Kaufmann et al. (2003). Policy
variables are averaged over the relevant period and are taken from World Bank economic
indicators, except the real exchange rate overvaluation, which comes from Dollar (1992).
This model is a simple multinomial logit model with 4 (unordered) outcomes: stable
growth, stagnation, collapse, and miracle growth. Of course, as discussed above, we do not
actually observe whether a country is in a given regime in any given year, but instead we have
the (estimated) probabilities of regime occurrences. To proceed with the logit estimation,
we convert the data on regime probabilities into counts of regime occurrences by multiplying
the probabilities by the number of years in the sample. For example, the data in Table 16
corresponds to the period 1970-94 and so multiplying the entries in the first row we attribute
to Hong Kong one year of stable growth, four years of stagnation, one year of crisis, and 17
years of miracle growth.19
We estimate the above model using pooled data for the subperiods 1970-82 and 1983-
94. Since the coefficient estimates are not easily interpreted, we do not report them here;
instead, we tabulate the estimated marginal effects at the median. Below we also examine
how these effects vary over the entire distribution of the right-hand side variables. This
is important since, as Easterly (2005) points out, there are often significant outliers in the
policy measures.
Table 17 shows the marginal effects of institutions, policies and income on the probability
of each of the four regimes for a hypothetical country with all the right-hand side variables
18See Kerekes (2009) for an alternative way to extend the approach in Jerzmanowski (2005) to multivariate
transition probabilities.
19An alternative strategy, would be to estimate a linear model of the log odds-ratios, which are given by
ln(Pr(regime = j)i/Pr(regime = 4)i = Xi βj for j = 1, 2, 3. where we have normalized β4 = 0. Here we
could use the probabilities of regime occurrences (Table 16) without the need to compute regime counts.
This approach gives very similar results but has the disadvantage of considerably over-predicting (in sample)
the probability of miracle growth, and we do not pursue it.
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Variable Stable Growth Stagnation Crisis Miracle Growth
Rule of Law 0.202*** -0.199*** -0.064*** 0.060***
(0.026) (0.026) (0.012) (0.015)
Inflation -0.110 0.058 0.015 0.037
(0.100) (0.073) (0.014) (0.027)
Overvaluation -0.310*** 0.240*** 0.043** 0.026
(0.065) (0.057) (0.018) (0.031)
Gov’t 2.086*** -0.806** -0.056 -1.224***
(0.445) (0.394) (0.153) (0.400)
Trade -0.434*** 0.228*** 0.046 0.161***
(0.072) (0.071) (0.032) (0.034)
Initial Income 0.132*** -0.078*** -0.018** -0.035**
(0.028) (0.025) (0.008) (0.016)
Table 7: Multinomial logit: marginal effects at the median. Standard errors in parentheses.
Significance levels:* 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
equal to the sample median (we refer to it as “median country”). The quality of institutions
increase the probability of favorable outcomes - miracle growth and stable growth while
reducing the chances of unfavorable regimes - stagnation and crisis. The size of government
lowers the likelihood of miracle growth but compensates this effect by increasing the chances
of stable growth and reducing the probability of stagnation and crisis. Trade lowers the
probability of stable growth while increasing that of miracle growth; it also increases the
chances of crisis and stagnation. Both distortionary policies, inflation and real exchange
rate overvaluation, increase the chances of stagnation and crisis, and lower the chances of
stable growth, although the effect of inflation is not statistically significant. Their effect
on miracle growth is also insignificant. Finally, the level of development as captured by
initial income has an independent influence on regimes; it lowers the probability of miracle
growth, which is the familiar convergence effect, albeit in a probabilistic sense. That is,
richer countries are less likely to grow at very rapid rates as predicted by the neoclassical
model as well as technology catch-up models. This effect is, however, mitigated by the fact
that income also increases the chances of stable growth. Higher income countries also appear
to stagnate less and have less frequent crises. We can use the marginal effect to calculate
the change in the probability of each regime given a one standard deviation change in the
right-hand side variables. These results are displayed in Figure 34.
Clearly, institutions not only deliver the desirable effects (more frequent growth states,
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Figure 13: Effects of a one standard deviation change in the right-hand side variables on
long run regime probabilities. All right-hand side variables set to the sample median.
less stagnation, and crises) but quantitatively also have a large impact. However, the effects
of government size and trade openness are also nontrivial, but they are, to some extent, off-
setting across regimes. For example, a one standard deviation increase in trade share means
3.5% more time spent growing fast and 10% less time growing at moderate stable rates.
To translate the effects on probabilities of regimes into effects on long-run growth, we can
multiply the effects from Figure 34 by the average long-run growth numbers for each regime,
reported in Table 15. We can perform a similar calculation for the volatility of growth. The
results are shown in Table 18. Note that the median growth rate in the sample was 1.46%, so
that for the median country a one standard deviation improvement in the rule of law results
in growth increasing to 2.38% (1.46 + 0.92). On the other hand, a one standard deviation
increase in government’s size results in growth falling to 1.26%. This relatively small change
is a net effect of the offsetting forces; larger government leads to less miracle growth but also
less stagnation and more stable growth. Overall, we can conclude that at the median the
effect of institutions on growth is much greater than that of any policy.20 This reflects two
findings. First, institutions do have a quantitatively large effect on growth, and second, for
some policies the effects on long run growth are off-setting across regimes. Similarly, note
that despite evidence of convergence (richer countries are less likely to grow very fast) poor
countries do not grow faster than rich ones. This is because at lower income levels they are
also more susceptible to prolonged periods of stagnation.
Of course, the above calculations do not fully characterize the effects of policies as these
are nonlinear and depend on the value of other explanatory variables. That is, the effect of
20Policies affect volatility more than average growth but again institutions are more important.
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Variable Growth Volatility
Rule of Law 0.922 -1.270
Inflation -0.037 0.149
Overvaluation -0.188 0.388
Gov’t -0.200 -0.195
Trade -0.004 0.294
Initial Income 0.029 -0.387
Table 8: Change in the average growth rate and volatility in response to one standard
deviation change in the right hand side variables. In % points.
inflation may be much different when it is close to the median level (as in the table above)
than when it is in the hyperinflation range. Similarly, the effect on inflation may be different
in countries with different quality of institutions. Finally, the distributions of the right-
hand side variables may be skewed so that a one standard deviation change (as in the table
above) may be either large or small relative to realistic changes in these variables. To get a
better understanding of these effects, we will graph them for the entire distribution of the
right-hand side variables. We will also look at whether the effects differ significantly across
countries with different institutional environments.
Figure 35 shows plots of the probability of the stable growth regime as functions of the
six explanatory variables. In each box, the probabilities are calculated by setting the value of
five variables to the sample median and varying the remaining variable over the percentiles
of the sample distribution. The first box shows that for a median country, the probability
of stable growth is increasing with income. With low income, the long run probability of
growing at stable rates is one-third, while for the richest country it is 60%. The quality
of institutions also improves the chances of stable growth (box two); however, the effect is
small in the lower part of the institutions’ distribution, it rises sharply around the median,
and flattens out again around the 60th percentile. Inflation (box three) has very little effect
except for values above the 88th percentile of the distribution where it significantly lowers the
likelihood of stable growth. This corresponds to 0.287 log inflation or about 33% annual rate
of inflation. Notice that while the effect of inflation on stable growth is consistent with the
idea that only extreme values of inflation matter, the threshold is not exceedingly high. Real
exchange rate overvaluation has a significant negative effect throughout the distribution,
but similarly to inflation, the effect is much more pronounced beyond the 88th percentile,
which is an overvaluation of 47%. The size of the government increases the chance of stable
growth; the estimates imply that going from 10% of government consumption in GDP to
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Figure 14: Probability of Stable Growth for the “median country”.
20% increases the long-run probability of stable growth from 40% to 60%. Finally, trade
lowers the probability of stable growth; quantitatively the estimates imply that increasing
the trade to GDP ratio from 36% to 96% results in the long run likelihood of stable growth
falling from 60% to 20%.
Figure 36 shows the probabilities of the miracle growth regime for a median country.
Income lowers the chance of fast growth reflecting convergence, but the effect is not very
large. As with stable growth, institutions have a positive effect, which again is steepest in
the middle of the distribution. Inflation matters only above the 88th percentile where it
lowers the chances of miracle growth. Real exchange rate overvaluation does not appear to
have a large effect. Government size significantly reduces the probability of a growth miracle;
increasing the share of government consumption from 10% to 20% reduces the probability
from 15% to only 5%. Finally, greater trade openness appears to increase the chances of a
growth take-off.
Note that in none of the boxes does the probability of miracle growth exceed 20%. In
fact, a hypothetical country with all the right-hand side variables set to the most miracle-
growth conducive values is predicted to spend 55% of time in miracle growth regime - below
actual values for countries like Hong Kong (72%) and Korea (86%). Of course, neither of
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Figure 15: Probability of Miracle Growth for the “median country”.
these countries had the hypothetical perfect policy mix, and consequently, the model predicts
they should spend even less than 55% of the time in miracle growth. We conclude from this
that while institutions and policy variables do affect the likelihood of miracle growth, there
are other factors at work (including possibly pure chance). This result mirrors the lack of
success of Hausmann and co-authors in explaining growth accelerations.
Several authors have investigated the relationship between the quality of institutions
and the effects of various other country characteristics on growth (e.g., Burnside and Dollar
2000, Serve´n et al. 2005). Aghion et al. (2004) show that the relationship between financial
openness and volatility may depend on the degree of development of financial markets, which
is presumably highly correlated with measures of institutions such as protection of property
rights - a part of the rule of law index.21 Here, because of the nonlinear nature of the
probability model, the effects of one variable depend on the level of the remaining variables.
The figure below shows plots of the miracle growth regime probabilities, calculated as above,
for two hypothetical economies: one with the sample’s highest value of quality of institutions
21Similarly, Aghion et al. (2008) provide a model and some evidence showing that the effects of fiscal
policy on growth again depend on the development of financial markets.
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(solid line) and another with the sample’s lowest (dashed line). All other variables remain
at the median level.
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
Inflation
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
Ex.Overvaluation
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
Size of Government
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
Trade
Figure 16: Probability of Miracle Growth for good (solid line) and weak (dashed) institutions
countries.
Figure 37 compares the probabilities of the miracle growth state. The large gap between
the two lines indicates how much higher the probability of the miracle regime is for countries
with good institutions. With the exception of inflation, policies have very different effects
depending on the quality of institutions. Exchange rate overvaluation, which appears to
have no effect for countries with weak institutions, increases the chances of miracle growth
for countries with good institutions. The opposite is true for the size of government; while
it appears to have little effect when institutions are weak, it greatly reduces the likelihood
of fast growth where institutions are strong. Finally, trade does not affect the probability of
fast growth with weak institutions but greatly increases it with good institutions.22
22The main findings for other regimes are that: (1) greater share of government consumption in GDP
reduces the probability of stagnation for weak-institutions countries, while also increasing, albeit by much
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We can take the approach used to construct Table 18 and translate the effects in Figures
35 - 37 into effects on long run growth and volatility. First, let’s again consider a country
with all variables except that of interest set to the sample median (the “median country”)
without distinguishing between high and low quality institutions.
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Figure 17: Effects of policies on growth in the “median country”.
Figure 38 shows the effects of policies on long-run growth for the median country. Inflation
does not significantly affect growth as long as it remains below the 88th percentile or about
33%, however, instances of extreme inflation have a devastating effect on growth. Exchange
rate overvaluation, especially when it is extremely high, lowers growth. The size of the
government initially lowers growth and then raises it, but the overall effect is small. This is
a result of two offsetting forces affecting the median country. As government size increases,
the likelihood of miracle growth falls, however, so does the probability of stagnation, and
the probability of stable growth rises significantly. This suggests that otherwise identical
less, the chances of a crisis, (2) trade significantly increases the probability of a crisis but only for countries
with weak institutions, and (3) extreme inflation increases the chance of a crisis everywhere, but the effect
is much stronger with weak institutions.
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countries with different sizes of government may grow at similar rates, but the nature of the
growth process will be different. Countries with a lower size of government will go through
periods of stagnation but will also enjoy periods of fast growth. Countries with a higher size
of government are more likely to grow at moderate but uninterrupted rates.
Figure 39 shows the effect of initial income and quality of institutions. As could be
anticipated from the effects on regime probabilities, institutions have a stronger effect on
long-run growth than any of the policies examined in Figure 38. Note , however, that
the effect is greatest around the median of the quality of institutions distribution. While
the leveling off could well be expected at high levels of institutional quality, the relatively
smaller effect for low quality of institutions is not obvious. It suggests the existence of a
“threshold effect” with regards to institutions and casts doubt on the ability of incremental
improvements of institutions to generate sustained growth accelerations in countries with a
weak rule of law. A qualitative summary is presented in Table 19.
10th Percentile Median 90th Percentile
Inflation 0 0 −−
Real Exchange Overvaluation − − −−
Government Spending − − +
Trade − − −
Rule of Law + ++ 0
Initial Income + + 0
Table 9: Effect on long run growth at the 10th percentile, the median, and the 90th percentile
of variables’ distribution. Effects are categorized as strongly negative (−−), negative (-),
negligible (0), positive (+), and strongly positive (++).
Figure 18: Effects of initial income and institutions on growth in the “median country”.
Figure 40 contrasts the long run growth effects of policies for countries with good (solid
line) and weak institutions(dashed line). The plots show growth relative to that of a country
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with all variables set to the sample median. Weak institutions appear to make economies
more vulnerable to the damaging effect of real exchange rate overvaluation and high inflation.
The size of government lowers growth for countries with good institutions in the entire range,
while for countries with weak institutions it lowers growth, albeit less strongly, below median
and raises it sharply above the median. As discussed above, this is a consequence of the
differential effect of government on the likelihood of stable growth versus miracle growth - it
increases the former while lowering the latter. For good-institutions countries, where stable
growth is the most likely regime this lowers average growth. However, for weak-institutions
countries, where stagnation dominates, stable growth is rare, and miracle growth is even
rarer, this raises growth.
Trade’s effect on growth also depends on institutions; it is positive when institutions are
good but turns strongly negative when they are weak. The beneficial effect of trade is to
increase the likelihood of miracle growth while the cost is the increase in the probability of a
crisis. The former effect is very strong with good institutions but virtually nonexistent with
weak ones (Figure 37). The latter, on the other hand, is insignificant for countries with good
institutions and quite strong for weak institutions.
These results, summarized in Table 20, suggest that the relationship between policies
and institutions is potentially quite complex and goes beyond the view that bad policies
are merely a manifestation of weak institutions, which are the ultimate determinants of
economic development as argued by Acemoglu et al. (2003). This is consistent with some
other recent findings. Fata´s and Mihov (2003) show that a country’s degree of discretionary
fiscal policy (measured by the unexplained variance from an estimated government spending
rule) is related to lax political institutions and is associated with lower growth and higher
GDP volatility. Cuberes and Mountford (2011) show that Fata´s and Mihov’s measure of
fiscal discretion is, in part, explained by historical variables. In particular, they argue that a
significant fraction of this ”discretionary” policy is indeed better attributed to institutional
quality. They then construct a tighter variable for fiscal discretion than the one explored in
Fata´s and Mihov (2003), i.e., the part of the unexplained variance of government spending
that is not accounted for by historical or geographical variables. Interestingly, they show
that even this, much tighter, measure of discretionary fiscal policy is negatively associated
with GDP volatility and growth. However, historical institutions also seem to have a direct
impact. Thus as in the above analysis, they conclude that while institutions are important
for growth and volatility, fiscal policy has an independent effect on growth performance.
Before concluding, we want to extend our analysis to include the effect of democracy
on regime switching. We do so because the strong and robust effect on growth reversals
reported above suggest the type of political institutions plays a role in growth transitions.
Introducing democracy into the analysis decreases the sample size somewhat so we decide
to treat this analysis in separation from the above main results.
The inclusion of democracy does not change the estimated effects of policies substantially
so we omit their exposition and focus on the effects of the rule of law, level of income and
democracy.23 Figure 41 below shows the estimated effects, evaluated at the median, of a
23One interesting change is that the effect of the rule of law on growth does not flatten out at high levels,
i.e., it goes from being S-shaped (see figures 35-36) to being J-shaped. It suggests that the flattening out
was a consequence of the correlation between democracy and the rule of law.
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Figure 19: Effects of policies on growth for good (solid line) and weak (dashed) institutions
countries. The vertical axis measures growth relative to an economy where all variables are
equal to the median.
one standard deviation change in initial income and the rule of law index from the model
without democracy (these are the same estimates as in Figure 34 and Table 18).
As discussed above, rule of law increases the probability of good regimes (miracle and
stable growth) while income increases the likelihood of stable growth and lowers that of
stagnation but also decreases the frequency of miracle growth (convergence effect). Figure
42 shows the effects in a model with democracy included among the explanatory variables.
Democracy increases the likelihood of stable growth and the estimated effects of rule
of law and income are now reduced. Democracy also slightly increases the probability of
stagnation and has a negative effect on the chance of a crisis that is similar in magnitude to
that of rule of law. Most importantly, however, democracy significantly lowers the likelihood
of miracle growth episodes. Furthermore, once democracy is accounted for, income has a
positive and small effect on the probability of a miracle take-off. That is richer countries are
less likely to grow rapidly because they are more democratic. This suggests that the conver-
gence effect uncovered before works mainly through the political economy channel and not
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10th Percentile Median 90th Percentile
Inflation Good Inst. 0 0 −
Weak Inst. 0 0 −−
Real Exchange Overvaluation Good Inst. 0 0 0
Weak Inst. − − −−
Government Spending Good Inst. − − −
Weak Inst. − 0 ++
Trade Good Inst. + + +
Weak Inst. − − −
Table 10: Effect on long run growth at the 10th percentile, the median, and the 90th
percentile of variables’ distribution; good institutions vs. weak institutions. Effects are cat-
egorized as strongly negative (−−), negative (−), negligible (0) , positive (+), and strongly
positive (++).
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Figure 20: Effects of a one standard deviation change in initial income and rule of law index
on long run regime probabilities. All right-hand side variables set to the sample median.
Model without democracy.
through standard channels such as diminishing marginal product of capital or technological
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Figure 21: Effects of a one standard deviation change in initial income, rule of law index
and democracy score on long run regime probabilities. All right-hand side variables set to
the sample median.
catch-up.24 This is consistent with the view of Olson (1982) who argued that democratic
societies may stagnate in the long run due to the detrimental effect of special-interest groups
which are able to organize and lobby for inefficient policies. Overall, the results imply that
democracy favors the middle at the expense of extremes - either very fast growth or severe
crises.
Overall the results of our investigation confirm some of the existing findings, namely
that institutional quality is a key determinant of long-run growth, as well as Easterly’s
finding that only extreme values of the distortionary policies (inflation rate and real exchange
rate overvaluation) have a significantly negative effect on growth. However, macro policies,
especially trade openness and the size of government also matter for changes in growth
patterns and thus influence the average growth and volatility in the long run. Crucially,
policies also differ in the channel through which they affect long-run growth. For example,
trade lowers the probability of stable growth and increases that of a crisis, while also making
miracle growth more likely. The size of government, on the other hand, lowers the chances
of miracle growth, while increasing the probability of stable growth at moderate rates. In
addition, the effects of policies depend in an important way on the quality of institutions.
In general, low quality of institutions makes economies more vulnerable to the harmful
effects of inflation and real exchange rate overvaluation. In some cases, the direction of the
effect is actually reversed; trade appears to be conducive to growth for countries with good
24Note that to the extent that Lipset hypothesis holds, i.e., democracy increases with income, this effect
will still lead to the standard convergence, whereby poor countries are catching up to the rich. However, see
Acemoglu et al. (2009) for evidence against the Lipset hypothesis.
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institutions and detrimental to growth for countries with bad ones. The size of government
has the opposite effect - it lowers growth when combined with good institutions and increases
it with weak institutions. Finally, when we extend the analysis to the effects of political
institutions by including a measure of democracy among the explanatory variables, we find
that similar to the rule of law, democracy increases the frequency of stable growth. Unlike
rule of law, however, democracy significantly lowers the chances of miracle growth takeoffs.
We also find that accounting for democracy removes the negative effect of initial income on
the probability of miracle growth, i.e., the convergence effect. This suggests that political
economy, in addition to diminishing marginal product of capital or technological catch-up,
is an important channel of convergence.
Abstract
In this chapter, we review the recent and growing literature on medium-term growth
patterns. This strand of research emerged from the realization that for most countries
economic development is a highly unstable process; over a few decades, a typical coun-
try enjoys periods of rapid growth as well episodes of stagnation and economic decline.
This approach highlights the complex nature of growth and implies that studying tran-
sitions between periods of fast growth, stagnation, and collapse is essential for under-
standing the process of long-run growth. We document recent efforts to characterize
and study such growth transitions. We also update and extend some of our earlier
research. Specifically, we use historical data from Maddison to confirm a link between
political institutions and propensity to experience large swings in growth. We also
study the role of institutions and macroeconomic policies, such as inflation, openness
to trade, size of government, and real exchange rate overvaluation, in the context of
growth transitions. We find surprisingly complex effects of some policies. For example,
openness to trade makes fast growth more likely but also increase the frequency of
crises. The size of government reduces the likelihood of fast miracle-like growth while
at the same time limiting the risk of stagnation. Moreover, these effects are nonlinear
and dependent on the quality of institutions. We conclude by highlighting potentially
promising areas for future research.
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6 Introduction
The revival of research on economic growth that began in the last decades of the 20th
century was spurred on by both theoretical and empirical contributions. On the theoretical
front the papers by Romer (1986, 1990), Lucas (1988), and later Grossman and Helpman
(1991), and Aghion and Howitt (1992) provided new ways of modeling endogenous growth
and technological progress. On the empirical side, the availability of a large cross-country
data set, the Penn World Tables, and early papers exploiting it (Mankiw et al. 1992, Barro
and Sala-i-Martin 1991) gave impetus for researchers to test old and new theories of growth
against the facts.
Following the early contributions (Barro, 1991; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992 ) most
researchers adopted the approach of using long run, 20 years or more, averages of growth of
GDP per capita (or per worker) as the variable to be explained in the empirical analysis.
There is enormous variation in long-run growth rates. For example, Jordan’s income per
capita increased by only 30% between 1970 and 2000, while that of Singapore increased
7-fold. In much of the growth literature of the last two decades, researchers tried to explain
such difference by looking for factors – openness to trade, protection of property rights, high
investment rates, etc. – that are necessary for growth and which Jordan lacks while Singapore
has in abundance. This literature has delivered many important insights but has also come
under severe criticism for difficulties with establishing causality and the lack of robustness
of many results (for example, the effect of trade on growth). However, there is another
reason why the overall balance of this empirical approach is quite disappointing. While
focusing on explaining long-run average growth rates is a sensible starting point, when one
wants to isolate long-run tendencies from higher frequency phenomena such as business cycle
fluctuations, it also removes the information about how economic growth changed within a
country over time. This would not be a significant loss if countries behaved like in the growth
models where economies approach balanced growth paths in a smooth monotonic fashion.
Unfortunately, most countries’ growth experiences are far from smooth; they often experience
long stretches of moderate growth interrupted by 5 or 10 year periods of rapid development
only to later fall victim to decades of stagnation or years of decline. Long term averages
remove these patterns and preclude us from using this variation to learn about the nature of
the process of economic growth. Lant Pritchett, a leading development economist, has been
one of the first to point out the disconnect between the prevailing empirical approach and
reality of economic growth. In one of the papers (Pritchett 2000), he writes:
The historical path of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in the United
States is, except for the interlude of the Great Depression, well characterized
by reasonably stable exponential trend growth with modest cyclical deviations:
graphically, it is a modestly sloping, slightly bumpy hill. However, almost nothing
that is true of U.S. GDP per capita (or that of other countries of the Organization
for Economic Co-operation and Development) is true of the growth experience of
developing countries. A single time trend does not adequately characterize the
evolution of GDP per capita in most developing countries. Instability in growth
rates over time for a single country is great, relative to both the average level of
growth and the variance across countries.
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These observations led Pritchett to list the fact that “Growth has been enormously vari-
able within developing countries, and there is little persistence of economic growth rates”as
one of his seven stylized facts of the international growth experience. To make things con-
crete, consider Jordan and Singapore again. Their growth paths are plotted in Figure 22. It
is apparent that the performance of the two countries is radically different, with Singapore
experiencing a spectacular period of rapid growth, and Jordan suffering a dramatic stagna-
tion. However, when inspecting Jordan’s growth in greater detail, as is done in Figure 23, it
becomes apparent that the forty years of its economic history are more than just a period
of uninterrupted stagnation. The years 1960-75, and even more so the periods 1985-90 and
1995-2000 have been relatively successful while the years 1975-1985 and 1990-95 brought a
substantial decline in income level. As it turns out, Jordan did not perpetually stagnate but
instead had periods of rapid growth and also of dramatic decline; its economic growth seems
to wax and wane. Explaining such medium-term cycles in economic performance seems
key to understanding long-run economic growth and discovering the right set of policies for
development and stability.
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Figure 22: Relative growth performance of Singapore and Jordan, 1960-2000. Initial GDP
per capita normalized to 100.
To see even more directly how average growth studies can be misleading consider Figure
24, which illustrates the paths of output per worker in three countries, the Republic of Congo,
Gabon, and Portugal, over the period 1960-1995. The values have been normalized to equal
one at the beginning of the period. The growth experiences of these three countries differ
vastly: Portugal experienced a period of rapid growth followed by a mild slowdown and a
return to relatively rapid growth, Congo went through a long period of rapid growth and
then a period of equally rapid decline. Finally, Gabon grew faster than the two remaining
countries until the late 1970s but stagnated after that. Yet after 40 years all three countries
have grown by a surprisingly similar amount, roughly tripling their GDP per capita. If
we look at average performance only, we will conclude that Congo, Gabon, and Portugal’s
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Figure 23: Jordan’s growth performance 1960-2000. Initial GDP per capita normalized to
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growth looks the same.
Why is understanding these patterns important? As a number of the papers described in
this chapter emphasize, starting rapid growth and sustaining it are two different phenomena.
We do not yet understand either of them very well. For example, increases in the variables
usually found to be strongly correlated with average long-run growth, such as investment
rates or trade openness, do not seem to initiate accelerations of economic growth. This
suggests that what the standard literature identifies as correlates of growth may not be the
factors that are needed to ignite it.
This chapter is an overview of the recent literature which studies the within-country
growth patterns and tries to, among other things, learn about the nature of the growth pro-
cess from analyzing differences in growth patterns such as those in Figure 24. This approach
highlights the complex nature of growth and implies that studying “growth transitions”, i.e.
switches between periods of fast growth, stagnation, and collapse is essential for understand-
ing the process of long-run growth. We begin by discussing early research that emphasized
the lack of persistence of growth and the diversity of growth experiences among developing
countries. We then summarize a series of more recent papers that look at growth transitions.
Here we extend one of our earlier contributions to look at growth transitions going back to
the late 19th century. We also discuss the idea of modeling growth in a non-linear structure
of multiple growth regimes and transitions between them. Here too, we extend our earlier
work by studying the role of macroeconomic policies in shaping growth patterns. We con-
clude by highlighting the achievements of the literature so far and pointing to potentially
fruitful avenues for future research.
7 Lack of Growth Persistence
The traditional analysis of growth assumes that there exist specific characteristics of countries
which are conducive to development. They either affect the growth rate of the economy
along a balanced growth path (BGP) or the level of the BGP or both. Among such factors
suggested by theory and explored empirically are investment rates, population growth rates,
quality of institutions, development of financial markets, quality of macroeconomic policies,
openness to trade, and many more. To keep our discussion general, we will refer to any
such growth-enhancing factor as X. An increase in X will, therefore, shift the BGP up or
increase its slope. In either case, a monotonic convergence to the new BGP follows. Once
on the BGP, of course, the economy will grow at a constant rate. It is instructive to start by
asking why, in this framework, would the growth rate of an economy change? Most models
predict that if a country is not on its BGP but is approaching it from below, growth will fall
monotonically. Similarly, if a country is above the BGP growth will increase monotonically.
Both of these possibilities suggest smoothly evolving growth and a reasonably large degree
of persistence of growth rates. Leaving aside, for now, the possibility of frequent shocks
that move the economy away from the BGP, the only way to get growth to change non-
monotonically is to have changes in X, i.e., to have changes that affect the BGP. If the
variable X, which determines the position and slope of the BGP jumps around a lot, so will
growth. Conversely, if X is reasonably stable, we would expect growth rates to be stable,
too. However, they are not. One of the first papers to draw attention to the variability of
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the growth process was Easterly et al. (1993). Specifically, they computed the correlation
of growth rates across decades (e.g., 1960-70 and 1970-80) as well as longer time periods
(20 and 30 years) in a sample of Penn World Table countries and found it to be quite low:
depending on sample and period the correlation coefficient was around 0.2-0.3. That is,
countries that developed rapidly in one decade are unlikely to be found in the group of fast
growers in the following ten years and conversely, slow growers are likely to pick up speed.
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Figure 25: Lack of growth persistence. Growth in GDP per capita 1985-95 versus 1995-2005.
Here we re-do the same exercise using more recent data. In Figure 25 we plot the average
growth of GDP per worker between 1985 and 1995 on the horizontal axis against the average
growth in the following decade using 150 countries in the PWT 6.3 data set. Just like
Easterly and his coauthors, we find very little persistence; the correlation coefficient is only
0.3.25 In Table 11 we report the results of regressing growth in a given decade on growth
in the previous one. While the relationship is positive (although not always significant), the
explanatory power of the regression never exceeds 11%.
Perhaps then the growth determinants – the X’s which much of the empirical growth
literature sought to identify – vary over time. Easterly et al. consider this possibility but as
they point out most growth determinants suggested by theory are very persistent: investment
rates, trade openness, and even government policies do not vary much from decade to decade.
In fact, one of the most robust correlates of development is the quality of institutions, a
characteristic which is usually thought to be a deep-rooted and very slow-moving variable.
This leaves the possibility that the growth rates we observe are just a consequence of ran-
dom shocks pushing countries out of steady states and the transitional dynamics that follows
25It is even lower when we keep two outliers: Liberia (whose output declined by an average 22% per year
between 1985 and 1995) and Equatorial Guinea (whose output increased by 28% annually during the decade
following 1995.)
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1995-2005 1985-1995 1975-1985
Growth in Previous Decade 0.226 0.326 0.121
(0.059) (0.075) (0.109)
Constant 0.012 0.004 0.006
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
R-squared 0.086 0.110 0.002
Obs. 150 146 112
Table 11: Update on Easterly et al (1993). Growth over a decade regressed on growth during
previous decade.
such shocks. However, Pritchett(2000) looks more closely at growth in developing countries
and concludes that a complex set of growth patterns can indeed be identified. These patterns
often do not resemble a shock-and-monotonic-transition-back-to-BGP scenario. Pritchett
writes “[S]hifts in growth rates lead to distinct patterns. While some countries have steady
growth (hills and steep hills), others have rapid growth followed by stagnation (plateaus),
rapid growth followed by a decline (mountains) or even catastrophic falls (cliffs), continuous
stagnation (plains), or steady decline (valleys).” He concludes that the empirics of growth
should focus on identifying factors that initiate and stop growth, instead of analyzing what
explains average growth.
8 Growth Transitions
Following the contributions by Easterly et al. (1993) and Pritchett (1998) several recent
papers have focused attention on growth transitions, i.e., points in time when a substantial
shift in growth occurs, such as an acceleration when the rate of expansion of GDP per capita
suddenly picks up significantly for an extended period. The main focus of these papers is
to identify such turning points.26 The common finding in all of these papers is that such
large growth changes are a common phenomenon in both rich and developing countries.
In particular, growth accelerations – defined in one paper as periods of rapid growth over
3.5 % per year (but usually much higher) – are quite common even among countries that
are regarded as unsuccessful developers. That is, now and then even poor countries grow
rapidly for a significant time. One of the key conclusions from this research is that igniting
26In this chapter, we focus on papers employing statistical methods to detect and analyze growth transi-
tions. Another approach is to look at case studies, that is analyze the development history of a single country
at a time with close attention to economic, political, and social changes. While important, this approach
offers a limited possibility for generalization of results, and we view it as complementary to the systematic
statistical approach. See the volume edited by Dani Rodrik (2003).
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rapid growth and sustaining it are two very different enterprises and that the latter seems
much more difficult (see Rodrik 2005). This is an important finding for policymakers but
also for the field of economic growth because it casts doubt on the applicability of standard
growth models to the question of economic development. The obvious next step in this
literature is to determine what forces lead to growth accelerations and how they can be
sustained. Here the literature has been less successful. Each of the contributions described
below attempts to shed some light on the causes of growth transitions, but our understanding
of this phenomenon is still limited.
Hausmann et al. (2005) are the first to develop a formal methodology for identifying
growth accelerations. They define “growth acceleration” as an episode satisfying three cri-
teria: (1) growth of GDP per capita exceeds 3.5% per year, (2) the increase in growth rate
exceeds 2 percentage points, and (3) after 7 years output per capita exceeds the highest level
attained prior to the episode. They use a spline regression to identify such episodes in a
large sample of countries between 1950 and 2000. To their surprise, they find a great many
accelerations; there are a total of 83 accelerations in their sample during the 36 years where
their methodology allowed for accelerations to occur. This implies that an average country
would have about a 25 % chance of experiencing a growth acceleration per decade. In fact,
60% of the countries in the sample had at least one episode of acceleration, and 23% had
at least two. The accelerations were also significant in magnitude with an average of 4.7
percentage points increase in growth. Hausmann and co-authors also investigate the causes
of growth accelerations. They run a probit where the dependent variable is a dummy that
takes the value of 1 around the time of a growth acceleration and 0 otherwise. The list of
covariates in their regressions includes a terms-of-trade shock, political regime change, and
economic liberalization. They find many results consistent with the conventional wisdom
in the growth literature: episodes of financial liberalization are positively correlated with
the probability of experiencing a growth acceleration, economic reforms help produce more
sustained accelerations, while shocks tend to produce short-lived growth. Additionally, they
find that the negative impact of a movement towards autocracy is much larger than the pos-
itive impact of a movement towards democracy. However, many growth accelerations do not
appear to be spurred by any apparent changes in standard growth determinants and, equally
interestingly, many instances of reform fail to produce fast growth. As the authors empha-
size, growth accelerations are surprisingly hard to explain, i.e., even if some of the variables
have a statistically significant effect, the overall predictive power of these regressions remains
quite low.27
27de Haan, J., and Jong-A-Pin (2007) use a different indicator of growth accelerations and find that
they tend to be preceded by economic reforms and that they are more likely to take place after the start
of a new political regime. In a related paper, Jones and Olken (2005) study in more detail the impact
of the accidental death of a political leader on the subsequent growth performance of the country he was
ruling. They find robust evidence that the impact of the death of a leader, particularly in an autocracy,
has a positive and significant impact on growth. Imam and Salinas (2008) study growth accelerations in
Sub-Saharan Africa and find that they are mostly associated with external shocks, episodes of economic
liberalization, political stability, and geographical variables such as proximity to the coast. On the other
hand, high levels of corruption, as well as falling domestic credit, seem to be correlated with sharp growth
decelerations. Aizenman and Spiegel (2010) focus on take-off from stagnation to rapid growth (i.e., they
exclude accelerations from already rapid growth to even higher one) and explore, among other factors, the
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Jones and Olken (2008) extend the analysis of Hausmann et al. to include both accel-
erations and decelerations in growth episodes. They identify growth transitions using the
Bai-Perron test (Bai and Perron 1998).28 Their findings confirm that such episodes are fre-
quent for most rich and developing countries; they detect 73 structural breaks in 48 of the
125 countries with at least 20 years of Penn World Table data. Of these transitions, 43 are
“up-breaks” or accelerations, and 30 are “down-breaks” or collapses. The breaks identified
by the Bai-Perron test are large: the mean change in growth during a break is 6.8 percentage
points for “up-breaks” and - 6 percentage points for “down-breaks”. Since their test seems
to set the bar for identifying an acceleration higher, they find fewer of them than Hausmann
et al. (2005). To better understand the nature of growth transitions, Jones and Olken (2008)
look for significant changes in main macroeconomic variables and measures of institutions
around the time of the transition. First, they perform a standard growth decomposition
separating growth of GDP into that of physical capital and the residual (TFP) and find
an interesting asymmetry whereby accelerations are associated with rapid TFP growth but
not significantly faster capital accumulation. “Down-breaks” are associated with declines in
both TFP and capital accumulation. They fail to find any significant change in institutional
variables at the time of growth breaks. Of the macroeconomic variables, accelerations ap-
pear to be associated with a significant increase in trade (both imports and exports) while
collapses coincide with increases in nominal instability (increase in inflation and nominal
exchange rate depreciation).
In Cuberes and Jerzmanowski (2009), we follow a similar approach. We also start by
identifying and documenting structural breaks in the growth process using the Bai-Perron
approach in the following specification
yt = αn + gnt+ εt for tn < t ≤ tn+1, ∀t = 1, ...T, (6)
where yt represents the logarithm of real output per worker relative to the United States,
the variable t indexes time, while n indexes growth breaks, gn represents the trend growth
following n-th break, and εt is the error term. That is, each time a break occurs, there can
potentially be a change in the intercept parameter, the slop, or both. We focus our attention
on the changes in growth rate (slope parameter).
We use data on real output per worker from the Penn World Table (Heston et al., 2006)
for the period 1950-2000. We find a total of 208 breaks, which corresponds to 1.8 breaks per
country. Of these breaks, 49% represent increases in the growth rate. Figure 26 shows the
case of Argentina, where the Bai-Perron methodology finds two structural breaks. The first
break occurs around 1980, and it corresponds to a substantial decline in Argentina’s growth
rate, which moves from positive (catching up to the U.S.) to negative (falling behind it).
The second break occurs around 1990, and this time growth becomes less negative without
changing its sign. The graph also shows the confidence intervals of these estimated breaks.29
composition of the country’s output.
28See also Ben-David et al. (2003).
29One concern about the Bai-Perron test of structural breaks is that it relies on asymptotic properties.
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Figure 26: Argentina’s log real output per worker relative to the US. The vertical dashed
lines indicate Bai-Perron break dates. The solid lines show the estimate of the trend part
of yt = αn + gnt. The figure also shows the confidence intervals around the estimated break
dates.
Next, we analyze the patterns in the trend-growth changes we have identified. We are
particularly interested in the link between political institutions and the magnitude of growth
swings. We are motivated by the strong evidence that democratic countries are less volatile
(Rodrik 2000, Quinn and Woolley 2001). This interesting correlation proved to be much
more robust than the democracy-growth relationship: while various studies find that the
effect of democracy on growth is rather weak (Przeworski and Limongi 1993, Barro and
Sala-i-Martin 2003), the link between a greater degree of democracy and lower economic
instability appears very robust. For example, Rodrik (1999) provides compelling evidence
that democratic countries experience less volatility. However, this literature usually measures
volatility using the standard deviation of annual growth rates. Having uncovered large and
frequent medium-term swings in growth, we investigate whether this sort of lower frequency
volatility is also related to political institutions. In particular, we estimate: (i) how the
magnitude of trend-growth changes varies with the degree of the country’s democracy, and
(ii) whether democracy affects the likelihood of experiencing large trend-growth swings.
To analyze the dynamics of growth transitions we estimate the following regression
gin = β0 + β1gin−1 + εin, (7)
where gin represents the growth rate in country i after break n estimated from (1). We
Since we use relatively short time series throughout the analysis, one may be concerned about inference
based on asymptotic results. To check the robustness of our break detection results, we employ a Bayesian
approach based on Wang and Zivot (2000) to estimate these breaks and compare our results with the ones
obtained using the Bai-Perron method. Our comparison focuses on the years at which breaks occur with
each method. The average difference (in absolute value) between the two estimates is 0.33 years, and its
standard deviation is 3.23. In 67% of the cases, the break dates are identical, and the difference is no larger
than 5 years 92% of the time.
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are interested in the coefficient β1, i.e., the existence and direction of a relation between
pre-break and post-break growth rates. Depending on the value of the β1 parameter, we
can have three interesting cases. First, if βˆ1 = 0 then, on average, the growth rate before a
break does not help predict the growth rate after it. If βˆ1 ∈ (0, 1) then there is monotonic
convergence in growth rates. This is a reversion-to-the-mean dynamic; i.e., exceptionally fast
growers before the break still grow fast after the break, just slightly less so; in the long run,
there is convergence to the BGP. Figure 27(a) illustrates the dynamics of this system for the
case where initial growth is above the long-run equilibrium value. When interpreting the
figure, recall that “periods” here are not calendar years but break dates. Thus growth may
remain constant for a long time, but when a break occurs, the adjustment is as illustrated in
the figure. Figure 27(b) shows the case in which βˆ1 ∈ (−1, 0) and so growth fluctuates from
above and below the BGP during its transition, in other words, the process is characterized
by growth cycles or reversals.
(a) Monotonic Convergence (b) Cycling
Figure 27: Panel (a): Monotonic convergence in growth rates (βˆ1 ∈ (0, 1)). Panel (b):
Growth reversals (βˆ1 ∈ (−1, 0)).
To see if the degree of democracy affect the dynamics of growth transition we split
the sample into high and low democracy groups and estimate equation (7).30 We use the
variable polity2 from the dataset POLITY IV (Marshall and Jaggers, 2002) as our measure
of democracy.31 As additional covariates in the estimated version of (7) we also include
the level of democracy and the log of initial income (to capture the standard convergence
dynamics) and decade dummies. We use alternative panel data estimators, but in Table 12
we only report the estimates obtained using the dynamic Arellano-Bond estimator. While
among the democratic countries we find no significant relationship between the pre and
30In Cuberes and Jerzmanowski (2009) we use an interaction term to avoid picking an arbitrary cut-off
level of democracy to split the sample.
31polity2 is an average of autocracy and democracy scores. It ranges from -10 to 10 (-10 = high autocracy;
10 = high democracy) and includes specific indexes meant to capture constraints on the executive, the degree
of political competition, the legislature effectiveness, etc.
51
post break growth rates (β1 ≈ 0), in the less democratic sample we see evidence of growth
reversals (β1 < 0). That is, periods of exceptionally high growth are, on average, followed
by periods of exceptionally low growth, and vice versa. Growth rates in less democratic
economies are not monotone; rather, they cycle between high and low (or even negative)
values as in Figure 27(b). Interestingly, the income level does not affect the propensity to
experience growth reversals.
Low Democracy High Democracy
Growth before Break -0.374** 0.083
(0.146) (0.202)
Initial Income -0.074** -0.069***
(0.036) (0.018)
Democracy 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
Constant -0.006 0.003
(0.005) (0.005)
Obs. 84 49
Table 12: Penn World Table data. Arellano-Bond.* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Using a probit and linear probability models, we also find that the propensity to expe-
rience substantial swings of trend-growth is not uniform across countries – less democratic
countries are more susceptible to it. When compared with factors commonly associated with
volatility, such as measures of quality of institutions, macroeconomic policies, and financial
development, as well as income level, we find that democracy is the most robust predictor
of a country’s propensity for growth reversals. Finally, we test whether our results can be
explained by the fact that countries which rely heavily on natural resources tend to be less
democratic and also exposed to large shocks (in the form of large swings of world prices of
the resources they export). While shocks to prices of natural resources appear to contribute
to the propensity for growth reversals, they do not account for the effect of democracy.32
32One may think that greater growth variability in less democratic countries is a reflection of more frequent
regime changes: i.e., whenever a ruler changes there is an abrupt change in growth. While Jones and Olken’s
(2005) result suggest leaders do matter for growth in less democratic countries, the average time between
breaks is usually shorter than many autocrats’ tenure. Easterly (2011) studies this question directly and
concludes that growth is equally variable within autocrats’ tenure as between them.
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In the above analysis, we use data on output per worker from the Penn World Table
covering, for most countries, the period 1960-2000. Here, in order to explore the presence
and dynamics of growth transitions in a longer time series, we extend our analysis to the
historical figures on output per capita from Maddison (1995, 2001) which covers the period
1870-1994.33 We again use the Bai-Perron test for structural breaks and we exploit the same
measures of democracy.34 We find that during this period the average number of breaks per
country in the Maddison sample is around 4. In 48% of the cases these breaks represent an
increase in growth. The lowest number of breaks per country is 2, and the largest is 8. Figure
28 presents an histogram of the changes in growth rates at the time of the structural break.
Since in the Maddison data the number of countries with available information on income
changes significantly over time, going from 14 countries in the 1870s to 29 in the 1920s and
to 54 from the 1960s on, we divide the number of breaks by the number of countries in each
year to better assess the relative frequency of breaks.
Figure 28: Frequency of growth breaks in the Maddison data set.
The first observation is that the frequency of breaks does not show a very clear trend if
one considers the entire period. The incidence of breaks was quite high in the 1880s, and in
33The 112 countries in Maddison’s unbalanced panel are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Cote d’Ivoire, Congo Rep., Czech Republic,
Denmark, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland,
Italy, Japan, Kenya, Korea Rep., Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan,
Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan,
Tanzania, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia.
34Using the Bayesian methodology of Wang and Zivot (2001), we get similar results.
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most cases, they represented sudden increases in growth. After that decade, the frequency of
breaks decreased and then rose again until the 1920s. The vast majority of structural breaks
that we detect in the 1930s were negative, indicating the economic turbulence of the Great
Depression. The opposite happens in the aftermath of WW2 (the 1940s), a period of very
frequent growth accelerations that reflect the economic recovery in many of the countries
in our sample. The number of breaks dropped drastically in the 1950s and rose again in
the last three decades of the studied period. It is noticeable that in these decades growth
decelerations were more common than accelerations. The key conclusion we draw from this
exercise is that the phenomenon of growth transitions is not unique to the modern period
studied by most papers in this literature.
Next, we ask whether, as was the case in the modern period PWT data, there is a
tendency for less democratic countries to experience larger growth swings. As we did in
Cuberes and Jerzmanowski (2009), we split countries into two groups: those with high
democracy and those with low democratic scores. 35 We then estimate an equation (7)
including as regressors initial income, the initial level of democracy, and time dummies for
each decade. Table ?? displays the results obtained using the fixed effects estimator.
All Coutries High Democracy Low Democracies
Growth before Break -0.307*** -0.157 -0.223 0.174 -0.388*** -0.468***
(0.095) (0.1) (0.148) (0.157) (0.113) (0.134)
Initial Income -0.029 -0.075*** -0.033 -0.109*** -0.048*** -0.062***
(0.018) (0.023) (0.027) (0.038) (0.015) (0.017)
Democracy 0.000 -0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Obs. 130 85 74 46 56 39
Table 13: Growth Reversals in Maddison data; Arellano-Bond. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05,
***p < 0.01.
In the entire sample there is evidence of growth reversals even after controlling for initial
income (column 2), although it is not statistically significant once one includes initial democ-
racy as an additional control (column 3). Columns 4 and 5 show that democratic countries
exhibit no cycling. The coefficient associated with growth before the break is not significant
35In both cases, the cut-off here is chosen to be the median value of polity2 in the sample, i.e. countries
with a democracy score equal or larger than this threshold are labeled ”high democracies,” and below it,
they are considered ”low democracies. Alternative cutoffs deliver very similar results.
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and it even turns positive. On the other hand, non-democracies experience growth reversals.
Columns 6 and 7 show that, in these countries, even after including democracy as an ex-
planatory variable, periods of rapid growth are followed by periods of much slower growth,
and vice versa. This is very much consistent with the results obtained using the PWT data
for the period 1950-2000.36
The above exercise gives us further confidence in the phenomenon of growth reversals
first described in Cuberes and Jerzmanowski (2009). Of course, the natural question to ask
is why less democratic institutions lead to larger growth swings? We hypothesize, following
arguments made by Acemoglu (2008) and Aghion et al. (2007), that less democracy implies
larger barriers to entry for firms and thus a larger degree of concentration in production.
With less diversification comes the potential for larger growth swings. Using data on man-
ufacturing concentration from the U.N’s Industrial Statistics Database (revision 2), we find
support for this argument. Specifically, we first calculate the Herfindahl-Hirschmann index
of concentration for the manufacturing industry in each of the 181 countries in our sample
during the period 1963-2003.37 We then regress this index against the POLITY IV measure
of democracy as well as per capita GDP and its square. Table 14 shows that the coefficient
on democracy is negative and significant at conventional levels, indicating that the manufac-
turing sector is indeed less concentrated in more democratic countries, even after controlling
for income effects.
Another reason less democratic countries may experience growth reversals is due to social
conflict. For example, Rodrik (1999) shows that the growth slowdowns of the 1970s were
larger in less democratic and more ethnolinguistically fictionalized countries. He argues that
both of these characteristics lead to more internal conflict because there are more groups in
the society who may have opposing interests, and the lack of democracy prevents peaceful
resolution of disputes among them. It is plausible that a mechanism like this could lead
to growth reversals. In early stages of rapid growth, its benefits are usually distributed
unevenly among the various groups in the society (workers vs. capital owners, exporters
vs. import-competing producers, educated vs. uneducated workers, etc.). If the rising
income inequality leads to social tension and conflict, and there are not peaceful resolution
mechanisms, internal turmoil and a growth collapse may be a direct consequence of the
preceding rapid growth. But there has been no formal test of this hypothesis
An interesting alternative explanation for growth reversals has recently been suggested
by Boucekkine and Pintus (2011). They develop an AK model of a small open economy with
borrowing constraints that allows for both leapfrogging and growth reversals. In their model,
economies have access to the international capital market, but there exists a borrowing limit
determined by the amount of available collateral. The novel element comes for the fact that,
if it is not possible for the borrower to commit to a future investment plan, the lender uses
the borrower’s past stock of capital as collateral. This assumption leads to interesting history
36It is also noticeable that in all cases, richer countries tend to experience more slow growth in the next
regime, indicating some degree of neoclassical convergence. The initial level of democracy, on the other hand,
is uncorrelated with future rates of growth.
37The dataset contains information on 29 manufacturing categories at the 3-digit level of disaggregation.
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Value Added Output Value Added Output
Democracy -0.159*** -0.166*** -0.111*† -0.121**
(0.052) (0.048) (0.070) (0.061)
GDP p.c. -0.386 -0.623**
(0.269) (0.263)
GDP p.c. Squared 0.019 0.034**
(0.018) (0.017)
Constant 2.880*** 2.739*** 4.629*** 5.402***
(0.136) (0.127) (1.060) (1.037)
R2 0.072 0.084 0.109 0.127
Obs. 2695 2623 2649 2591
Table 14: Democracy and Industrial Concentration. Pooled OLS regression of the
Herfindahl-Hirschman index in manufacturing on democracy, GDP per capita, and GDP
per capita squared. Standard errors clustered by country. *† < 0.12, *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05,
***p < 0.01.
dependence: the BGP of the economy depends not only on the initial level of capital but also
on its past growth path. This dependence of the borrowing limit on a lagged capital stock
is also key to generating growth reversals and/or leapfrogging. If the delay – the number of
periods before the borrowing date that the lender takes into account as collateral – is short,
then history does not matter much. Therefore, a rich country that had a recent slow growth
will receive a low amount of credit, and therefore, it will grow slowly in the future. So, in
this case, there will be leapfrogging and no growth reversals (a country that had performed
poorly will continue to do so in the future). Growth reversals (instances when growth goes
from above BGP value to below it) are also possible. They occur when a fast-growing country
faces the borrowing constraint with a sufficiently long lag. Since its capital stock was low
in the past, its current debt limit is low, and the lack of foreign capital inflow leads to a
growth slowdown. There is also an intermediate case where both leapfrogging and growth
reversals are possible. The authors argue that under reasonable parameter values, the model
is able to replicate characteristics of growth reversals reported in Cuberes and Jerzmanowski
(2009). The paper by Boucekkine and Pintus is especially noteworthy because it represents
one of the first attempts to construct a theory of growth transitions.38
Finally, we should note that the theories of poverty traps would appear to be natural
explanations for growth transitions. After all, most such models predict a long period of
stagnation or slow growth (poverty trap) and a sudden acceleration of growth once the
38Aghion et al. (2004) are motivated by more high-frequency volatility but their model, in which periods
of economic boom put upward pressure on the price of the scarce domestic factor of production which leads
to a slowdown, suggest another interesting mechanism for generating growth reversals.
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economy escapes the trap. However, most of these theories also imply that the escape from
the trap is once and for all. Easterly (2006) uses the Bai-Perron test to identify episodes
of permanent growth take-off, i.e., growth permanently transiting from zero to a positive
value, which he interprets as evidence of emergence from a poverty trap. He finds very few
such episodes. This is consistent with our findings that growth accelerations, especially in
non-democratic countries, are ultimately reversed.
One conclusion reiterated in the papers discussed above is that initiating growth and
sustaining it require different policies and/or environments. For example, Hausmann et al.
(2005) show that standard economic and political fundamentals (economic reform, political
regime change, terms of trade shocks, etc.) do rather poorly at explaining the timing of
growth accelerations. A paper by Berg et al. (2008) asks a very natural complementary
question: what is the role of standard growth determinants in sustaining growth? Of course,
knowing what makes growth sustained is key for policymakers in developing world, perhaps
more important than knowing how to start it since accelerations happen quite often (even
if we don’t fully understand why). To investigate the duration of growth spells Berg and
coauthors estimate a proportional hazard model using a host of potential determinants in-
cluding shocks (world interest rate, terms of trade), institutions, macroeconomic stability,
social and economic homogeneity, human capital, and trade and financial openness (includ-
ing structure of exports and capital inflows). Where appropriate and possible, the authors
include the initial level as well as the change during the spell for the explanatory variables.
To measure growth spell duration, they use a combination of the Hausmann et al. (2005),
and Jones and Olken (2008) approaches to dating growth accelerations. Specifically, the
authors focus their attention on episodes of growth acceleration to above 2% followed by
deceleration to below 2% (complete spells) or end of sample (incomplete spells). Among
their findings, they report that democracy, income equality, macroeconomic stability as well
as export orientation (including propensity to export manufactures, openness to FDI, and
avoidance of exchange rate overvaluation) all help sustain growth spells. Perhaps surpris-
ingly, violent conflict doesn’t appear to matter. Conditional on the covariates the authors
usually find positive but often not significant duration dependence.39
9 Growth Regimes
Just as averaging growth over long periods of time masks the diverse experience of growth
accelerations and collapses, the binary classification of a growth transition (acceleration ver-
sus its absence) removes some important variation across countries and time. In fact, in
Pritchett’s analysis cited above he distinguished multiple growth patterns, of which accel-
erations (and collapses) were just one example. In another paper, Pritchett (2003) suggest
that an appropriate way to think about growth is to imagine that there exist multiple growth
states, or regimes, each of which represents a distinct growth behavior.
Pritchett illustrates his idea with a simulation of a simple model with four states: a
stagnation state with constant growth of 0.5 %, a convergence state with rapid growth, an
implosion state with negative growth, and a state of steady growth at 1.8 %. He assumes that
39See also Johnson et al. (2007).
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the state characteristics (growth rates in each state) and that transition probabilistically are
constant and identical for all developing countries. He then calibrates the transition matrix in
so that the world economy with 103 developing countries and 14 developed countries (which
are restricted to always be in the steady growth regime) matches the observed dispersion of
GDP per capita in 1995. His main message is that a model of this kind has the potential
to generate a wide range of growth patterns among developing countries as well as account
for low persistence of growth discussed above. Notice that in this model, it is only the
randomness of the (common) transition dynamics that generates the diversity of growth
patterns across developing countries. However, in practice, there is no particular reason to
think that transition probabilities are the same for all countries. The idea that country-
specific characteristics affect growth by determining transition probabilities leads to some
interesting possibilities.
To illustrate the idea, consider the following simple example. Suppose that there are
only two possible states of the world - one in which the economy stagnates and another in
which it grows at 3% per year. If over time a country switches between regimes, growth will
be an uneven process. This is, of course, what growth looks like for many countries. For
example, Japan accelerated in the 1950s and ’60s and then stagnated in the 1990s, while
India grew slowly until it took off in the 1990s. If we further assume that these transition
probabilities themselves depend on some country-specific characteristic X (e.g., quality of
institutions), we have a model where country characteristics, such as policies or institutional
quality, shape long-run growth by affecting the frequency of the two regimes.
Within a standard approach to growth, if a characteristic X is “good” for growth then
countries with a high level of X are expected to be growing fast (say, at 3% per year)
and countries with low levels of X are expected, all else equal, to be growing slowly (say,
stagnate); this is a world where “you either have what it takes for growth, or you don’t”.
In the regimes approach it becomes possible for country characteristics to be favorable to
growth by affecting the transition probabilities; good X means more frequent episodes of
growth, but it is possible for a high-X country to stagnate just as it is possible for the low-X
country to grow from time to time. A stylized illustration of the switching process of growth
for two countries is presented below in Figure 29.
Country 1 has a lower level of the growth-conducive characteristic X, and so it spends
more time in the stagnation regime. However, it is capable of periods of fast growth. In fact,
when it is growing, it grows as fast as country 2. Of course, country two with high X visits
the growth regime more frequently, and so, in the long run, it will grow faster. However, it
too stagnates from time to time. What determines the long run growth performance of an
economy is the within-regime dynamics (3% vs. 0), and the frequency of visits to the two
growth regimes. The growth regimes approach calls for identifying the regimes as well as the
properties of transitions, including the set of X’s which may include present-day economic
and political characteristics of the country, regional or world variables, the country’s history,
etc.
Jerzmanowski (2005) estimates a model where transition probabilities are allowed to
differ across countries, as was the case in the example of Figure 29. He builds on Pritchett’s
insights and applies the framework of Markov-switching regression to identify the regimes.
Assuming that there are four regimes, each with a distinct AR(1) growth process leads to
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Figure 29: A stylized illustration of the switching process of growth. Some country-specific
characteristic X makes the growth regime more likely (e.g., good institutions). Country one
has a low value of X, and so it spends more time in the stagnation regime. However, it
is capable of periods of fast growth. Country two has high X, and so it visits the growth
regime more frequently. However, it too stagnates from time to time.
the following model40
yˆit = αst + βst yˆit−1 + ε
st
it , (8a)
εstit ∼ i.i.d.N(0, σ
2
st
), (8b)
where yˆt i is the growth rate of country i in period t and st indicates the regime that is
in effect at time t, that is for every t, st ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}.
The growth process is fully characterized by the above within regime dynamics (8) and
the evolution of regimes, which is assumed to follow a 4-state Markov process where the
transition probabilities are allowed to depend on the country’s quality of institutions. That is,
P{sit = k | sit−1 = j} ≡ pjk = pjk(zi) for j, k = 1, ..., 4, where zi is a measure of the quality of
institutions in country i. Thus unlike in Pritchett’s simple simulation, transition probabilities
are country specific. This model is estimated using maximum likelihood (see Jerzmanowski
(2005) a for details). The resulting estimates consist of the within-regime parameters (α’s,
40Unfortunately, the correct number of regimes cannot be tested with the simple likelihood ratio test. See
Hamilton (1994) for discussion and references. The informal procedure followed by Jerzmanowski (2005)
was to start with two regimes and increase the number of regimes as long as all estimated regimes appeared
distinct.
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β’s, and σ’s), the parameters of the transition matrix pjk(zi) for j, k = 1, ..., 4, and the
inference about regimes st for t=1,...T. We discuss them in turn.
Table 15 shows the parameter estimates. Each of the four AR(1) processes implies a
different long-run growth rate, i.e., the average growth rate that would obtain if the economy
were to remain in that regime indefinitely, given by α/(1−β) and shown in the last column.
Notice that these average long-run growth rates (from which we derive the regime labels)
do not fully characterize the regimes. In addition to the long run average performance,
regimes differ significantly in the volatility of growth (σ) and persistence of growth shocks
(β).41 The stable regime corresponds to the growth experience predominant among developed
economies, with a long-run average growth of about 2 percent. The volatility is relatively
low, and there is a great deal of persistence in the growth process. The stagnation regime
is characterized by no growth on average and larger volatility of growth shocks. In this
regime, periods of growth and decline occur but are not very persistent. The crisis regime
is an episode of large shocks to growth. While these shocks tend on average to be negative
reflecting economic crises, the dispersion is very large and positive shocks are also possible.
These shocks have no persistence. Finally, there exists the regime of fast, miracle-like growth
with a long run average growth of 6% and modest volatility.
Constant (αs) AR Coeff. (βs) Std. Dev.(σs) Long Run Growth
Stable Growth 0.0132∗∗ 0.3761∗∗ 2.11% 2.12%
Stagnation 0.0010 0.1799∗∗ 4.56% 0.12%
Crisis −0.0101∗∗ -0.0045 13.16% −1.00%
Miracle Growth 0.0536∗∗ 0.1417∗∗ 2.71% 6.25%
Table 15: Within regime estimates of yˆt i = αst + βst yˆt−1 i + ε
st
ti , and ε
st
ti ∼ i.i.d.N(0, σ
2
st
)
for each of the four states. The first column shows the constant term, the second is the
autoregressive coefficient and the third is the estimate of the standard deviation of the error
component. The last column shows the implied long run growth. A ∗ denotes significance
at 10% level, ∗∗ denotes significance at 5% level.
Figure 30 summarizes the estimates of transition matrices. Each of the four boxes plots
the probability of moving from a given state to each of the four states as a function of
the institutions index. For example, the upper left-hand side box shows the probability of
moving from the stable growth state to each of the four states. The solid line shows the
41Note that the within-regime persistence of the growth process β, say 0.3761 for the stable growth regime,
should not be confused with the persistence of the stable growth regime itself. The former is assumed to
be a property of the stable growth process common to all countries, whereas the latter depends on the
country-specific transition probabilities, which will be discussed below.
60
probability of moving to the stable state (i.e., in this case remaining in the same state), the
dash-dot line shows the probability of moving to stagnation while the dashed and dotted
lines show the same for crisis and miracle regimes, respectively. The upper right-hand side
box shows the same set of plots conditional on the current state being stagnation and so on.
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Figure 30: Transition probabilities as a function of the quality of institutions. The upper
left-hand side box shows plots of the probability of moving from state one to each of the
four states. The solid line shows the probability of moving to state one (i.e., probability of
remaining in the same state), the dash-dot line shows the probability of moving to state two
while the dashed and dotted lines show the same for state three and four, respectively.
The stable growth regime is very persistent for all values of the institutions index, but
the persistence does increase with the quality of institutions. Stagnation is very persistent
for weak-institutions countries, but this persistence falls off markedly with the quality of
institutions above 0.6 (e.g., Turkey). For high quality of institutions countries, a period
of stagnation is more likely to be followed by a reversal to stable growth. The lower left-
hand side graph shows the probability of changing regimes conditional on the current state
being the growth shock (crisis) state. Finally, the lower right-hand side graph shows the
probability of changing regimes conditional on the current state being the fast growth state.
For low-quality countries, a period of fast growth is very likely followed by a growth shock
state. Intermediate quality countries are also not likely to remain in the growth regime for
long and most likely revert to stagnation. However for mid-to-high institutions countries the
61
fast growth regime is very persistent.
Figure 31 shows the plots of the ergodic distribution of states for different levels of insti-
tutional quality. The most important feature is that countries with low quality of institutions
spend about 60% of the time in stagnation, and only around 15-20% of the time growing at
positive and sustained but moderate rates. For values of the quality of institutions above
0.4, the time spent stagnating starts decreasing while the fraction of time spent growing
increases. However, the quality of institutions must be above 0.6 for stagnation to no longer
be the most frequent state. Improving institutions also increases the time spent growing fast
(Miracle Growth). For values of the index above 0.7 (e.g., Mauritius) more time is spent
growing fast than stagnating.
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Figure 31: Ergodic probabilities of the four regimes as functions of the quality of institutions.
These estimated transition probabilities imply that institutions are more important in
sustaining growth than in igniting it. In particular, low quality of institutions countries have
a significant probability of entering growth regimes, however, the probability of exit is high.
In the long run regimes follow an ergodic distribution where low quality of institutions leads
to frequent stagnation and crises whereas high quality, while not ruling out stagnation or
crises, reduces their frequency and increases that of the growth regimes.
These results suggest that randomness of the transition between regimes is not the only
factor accounting for differences in growth patterns across countries. In particular, the
quality of institutions, widely believed to be an important growth determinant, affect the
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transition dynamics. High quality of institutions, such as a strong rule of law and protection
of private property, increase the frequency of visits to favorable regimes but most importantly
make them more persistent; countries with weak institutions are capable of growth takeoffs,
however, they are unable to sustain them.
10 Policies, Institutions, and Regime Switching
Pritchett’s (2003) simple simulation illustrated that a model which includes multiple growth
regimes and random transitions between them can account for the large diversity of growth
patterns. Jerzmanowski (2005) extends this insight by explicitly estimating a regime-switching
growth model and allowing the transition probabilities to depend on the quality of the coun-
try’s institutions. This raises a natural question about what other country characteristics
influence the probability of transitions between regimes. In this section, we provide a novel
analysis of this question. We focus on the role of macroeconomic policies.
The question of whether macroeconomic policies such as inflation, government spending,
real exchange rate overvaluation, and trade openness matter for long-run economic growth
has a long history in empirical growth literature. Early research on determinants of growth
in a cross-section of countries found significant effects of macroeconomic policies on long-
run growth (e.g. Barro 1991, Dollar 1992, Sachs and Warner 1995). However, much of the
recent literature is more skeptical. Easterly and Levine (2003) argue that, after controlling for
institutions, policies do not affect the level of income. Easterly (2005) shows that the findings
of significant effects of policies on growth are driven by extreme outliers. Finally, Acemoglu
et al. (2003) argue that once institutions are controlled for, policies do not matter much
for growth and volatility. Here we re-examine the question of policies and growth, while
explicitly accounting for within-country variation in the growth process. This framework
is richer than the standard average growth analysis since it allows policies to work through
multiple channels by differentially affecting the likelihood of growth accelerations, stagnation,
and crisis. We use the regime probabilities obtained by Jerzmanowski (2005) to estimate
the effects of policies on the frequency of the four growth regimes. We ask whether some
policies are associated with a country spending more time in periods of growth, stagnation,
or crisis.
In order to study the joint effect of institutions and policies on growth through their
effect on regimes changes, one could follow the same approach as Jerzmanowski (2005) and
extend the vector z in the transition probabilities matrix p(z) to include measures of policy.
In practice, the estimation is quite computationally intensive, even with only one variable.
Instead, we use the inference about the likelihood of regimes obtained from the estimation
of the baseline model. The logic of the approach is as follows.
Since the true value of the regime is unobservable, we can never know with certainty
whether a given country is in any given state. However, conditional on the model, the
estimated parameters, and all the observations for a given country, we can form inference
about the probability of the regimes during the sample period. These smoothed probabilities,
denoted by Pˆ (st = j|YmT ), where YmT stands for the entire time series for country m, give
us an estimate of the likelihood of each of the four regimes for country m at all sample dates
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t. For example, Pˆ (s1979 = 1|YUS T ) tells us the (conditional) probability that the U.S. was in
the stable growth regime in 1979. Figures 32 and 33 plot examples of the smoothed regime
probabilities.
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Figure 32: Regime probabilities: Brazil
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Figure 33: Regime probabilities: Ghana
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Table 16 below presents the smoothed probabilities averaged over the sample period 1970-
94 for each of the regimes for a selected group of countries. That is, for each country the first
column gives the average probability of the stable growth regime (1/T )
∑T
l=1 Pˆ (sl = 1|YT ),
the second column gives the average probability of stagnation (1/T )
∑T
l=1 Pˆ (sl = 2|YT ), and
so on. These probabilities tell us what is the average (over sample years) probability that a
country was in a given regime. For example, on average the probability that Japan was in
the miracle growth regime is 33% while the average probability that it was stagnating is 5%.
country Stable Growth Stagnation Crisis Miracle Growth Avg. Growth
Hong Kong 0.04 0.17 0.06 0.72 5.56%
Japan 0.62 0.05 0.00 0.33 4.31%
Thailand 0.13 0.33 0.03 0.51 4.36%
Portugal 0.51 0.13 0.01 0.36 3.92%
Malaysia 0.31 0.24 0.03 0.42 3.48%
Egypt 0.50 0.40 0.05 0.06 2.20%
India 0.37 0.51 0.03 0.09 2.10%
USA 0.89 0.07 0.00 0.03 2.04%
Mexico 0.52 0.35 0.02 0.11 1.68%
Chile 0.05 0.45 0.16 0.34 1.64%
Zimbabwe 0.05 0.72 0.15 0.08 1.03%
New Zealand 0.74 0.21 0.01 0.04 0.90%
Bolivia 0.45 0.43 0.08 0.03 0.10%
Cote d’Ivoire 0.02 0.61 0.15 0.22 0.07%
Table 16: The columns report average smoothed probabilities of regimes, i.e. the esti-
mates of regimes’ likelihood based on the entire sample. Let Pˆ (st = 1|YT ), the smoothed
inference about the likelihood that regime one was in effect in period t. Column one is
(1/T )
∑T
l=1 Pˆ (sl = 1|YT ), column two is (1/T )
∑T
l=1 Pˆ (sl = 2|YT ) and so on.
We assume that the averages frequencies approximate the ergodic regime distribution
and use them to compute the average number of occurrences of each regime during the
sample period. We then ask how the country’s quality of institutions and macroeconomic
policies affect regime probabilities. In particular, we average the estimated probabilities
over two subperiods, 1970-82 and 1983-1994, and run a pooled multinomial logit. If, as was
assumed by Jerzmanowski (2005), quality of institutions is the only variable determining
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transition probabilities, we would expect to replicate the estimates of the relationship be-
tween the ergodic distribution of regimes and the institutional quality presented in Figure
31, with departures from this distribution being purely random and unrelated to policies.
Alternatively, if policies do matter, they will add additional explanatory power in fitting the
observed regime distributions.42
To determine the relationship between policies and institutions and regime frequencies
we estimate the following multinomial logit model.
Pr(regime = j)i =
exp(Xi βj)
∑4
s=1 exp(Xi βs)
, (9)
(10)
for j = 1, 2, 3,4. Pr(regime = j) is the average probability of regime j during the sample
periods, and Xi is a vector of country specific characteristics including initial income, quality
of institutions and four policy measures: log of average inflation, real exchange rate overval-
uation, the share of government’s consumption in GDP, and trade to GDP ratio. Quality
of institutions is measured using the rule of law index from Kaufmann et al. (2003). Policy
variables are averaged over the relevant period and are taken from World Bank economic
indicators, except the real exchange rate overvaluation, which comes from Dollar (1992).
This model is a simple multinomial logit model with 4 (unordered) outcomes: stable
growth, stagnation, collapse, and miracle growth. Of course, as discussed above, we do not
actually observe whether a country is in a given regime in any given year, but instead we have
the (estimated) probabilities of regime occurrences. To proceed with the logit estimation,
we convert the data on regime probabilities into counts of regime occurrences by multiplying
the probabilities by the number of years in the sample. For example, the data in Table 16
corresponds to the period 1970-94 and so multiplying the entries in the first row we attribute
to Hong Kong one year of stable growth, four years of stagnation, one year of crisis, and 17
years of miracle growth.43
We estimate the above model using pooled data for the subperiods 1970-82 and 1983-
94. Since the coefficient estimates are not easily interpreted, we do not report them here;
instead, we tabulate the estimated marginal effects at the median. Below we also examine
how these effects vary over the entire distribution of the right-hand side variables. This
is important since, as Easterly (2005) points out, there are often significant outliers in the
policy measures.
Table 17 shows the marginal effects of institutions, policies and income on the probability
of each of the four regimes for a hypothetical country with all the right-hand side variables
42See Kerekes (2009) for an alternative way to extend the approach in Jerzmanowski (2005) to multivariate
transition probabilities.
43An alternative strategy, would be to estimate a linear model of the log odds-ratios, which are given by
ln(Pr(regime = j)i/Pr(regime = 4)i = Xi βj for j = 1, 2, 3. where we have normalized β4 = 0. Here we
could use the probabilities of regime occurrences (Table 16) without the need to compute regime counts.
This approach gives very similar results but has the disadvantage of considerably over-predicting (in sample)
the probability of miracle growth, and we do not pursue it.
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Variable Stable Growth Stagnation Crisis Miracle Growth
Rule of Law 0.202*** -0.199*** -0.064*** 0.060***
(0.026) (0.026) (0.012) (0.015)
Inflation -0.110 0.058 0.015 0.037
(0.100) (0.073) (0.014) (0.027)
Overvaluation -0.310*** 0.240*** 0.043** 0.026
(0.065) (0.057) (0.018) (0.031)
Gov’t 2.086*** -0.806** -0.056 -1.224***
(0.445) (0.394) (0.153) (0.400)
Trade -0.434*** 0.228*** 0.046 0.161***
(0.072) (0.071) (0.032) (0.034)
Initial Income 0.132*** -0.078*** -0.018** -0.035**
(0.028) (0.025) (0.008) (0.016)
Table 17: Multinomial logit: marginal effects at the median. Standard errors in parentheses.
Significance levels:* 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
equal to the sample median (we refer to it as “median country”). The quality of institutions
increase the probability of favorable outcomes - miracle growth and stable growth while
reducing the chances of unfavorable regimes - stagnation and crisis. The size of government
lowers the likelihood of miracle growth but compensates this effect by increasing the chances
of stable growth and reducing the probability of stagnation and crisis. Trade lowers the
probability of stable growth while increasing that of miracle growth; it also increases the
chances of crisis and stagnation. Both distortionary policies, inflation and real exchange
rate overvaluation, increase the chances of stagnation and crisis, and lower the chances of
stable growth, although the effect of inflation is not statistically significant. Their effect
on miracle growth is also insignificant. Finally, the level of development as captured by
initial income has an independent influence on regimes; it lowers the probability of miracle
growth, which is the familiar convergence effect, albeit in a probabilistic sense. That is,
richer countries are less likely to grow at very rapid rates as predicted by the neoclassical
model as well as technology catch-up models. This effect is, however, mitigated by the fact
that income also increases the chances of stable growth. Higher income countries also appear
to stagnate less and have less frequent crises. We can use the marginal effect to calculate
the change in the probability of each regime given a one standard deviation change in the
right-hand side variables. These results are displayed in Figure 34.
Clearly, institutions not only deliver the desirable effects (more frequent growth states,
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Figure 34: Effects of a one standard deviation change in the right-hand side variables on
long run regime probabilities. All right-hand side variables set to the sample median.
less stagnation, and crises) but quantitatively also have a large impact. However, the effects
of government size and trade openness are also nontrivial, but they are, to some extent, off-
setting across regimes. For example, a one standard deviation increase in trade share means
3.5% more time spent growing fast and 10% less time growing at moderate stable rates.
To translate the effects on probabilities of regimes into effects on long-run growth, we can
multiply the effects from Figure 34 by the average long-run growth numbers for each regime,
reported in Table 15. We can perform a similar calculation for the volatility of growth. The
results are shown in Table 18. Note that the median growth rate in the sample was 1.46%, so
that for the median country a one standard deviation improvement in the rule of law results
in growth increasing to 2.38% (1.46 + 0.92). On the other hand, a one standard deviation
increase in government’s size results in growth falling to 1.26%. This relatively small change
is a net effect of the offsetting forces; larger government leads to less miracle growth but also
less stagnation and more stable growth. Overall, we can conclude that at the median the
effect of institutions on growth is much greater than that of any policy.44 This reflects two
findings. First, institutions do have a quantitatively large effect on growth, and second, for
some policies the effects on long run growth are off-setting across regimes. Similarly, note
that despite evidence of convergence (richer countries are less likely to grow very fast) poor
countries do not grow faster than rich ones. This is because at lower income levels they are
also more susceptible to prolonged periods of stagnation.
Of course, the above calculations do not fully characterize the effects of policies as these
are nonlinear and depend on the value of other explanatory variables. That is, the effect of
44Policies affect volatility more than average growth but again institutions are more important.
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Variable Growth Volatility
Rule of Law 0.922 -1.270
Inflation -0.037 0.149
Overvaluation -0.188 0.388
Gov’t -0.200 -0.195
Trade -0.004 0.294
Initial Income 0.029 -0.387
Table 18: Change in the average growth rate and volatility in response to one standard
deviation change in the right hand side variables. In % points.
inflation may be much different when it is close to the median level (as in the table above)
than when it is in the hyperinflation range. Similarly, the effect on inflation may be different
in countries with different quality of institutions. Finally, the distributions of the right-
hand side variables may be skewed so that a one standard deviation change (as in the table
above) may be either large or small relative to realistic changes in these variables. To get a
better understanding of these effects, we will graph them for the entire distribution of the
right-hand side variables. We will also look at whether the effects differ significantly across
countries with different institutional environments.
Figure 35 shows plots of the probability of the stable growth regime as functions of the
six explanatory variables. In each box, the probabilities are calculated by setting the value of
five variables to the sample median and varying the remaining variable over the percentiles
of the sample distribution. The first box shows that for a median country, the probability
of stable growth is increasing with income. With low income, the long run probability of
growing at stable rates is one-third, while for the richest country it is 60%. The quality
of institutions also improves the chances of stable growth (box two); however, the effect is
small in the lower part of the institutions’ distribution, it rises sharply around the median,
and flattens out again around the 60th percentile. Inflation (box three) has very little effect
except for values above the 88th percentile of the distribution where it significantly lowers the
likelihood of stable growth. This corresponds to 0.287 log inflation or about 33% annual rate
of inflation. Notice that while the effect of inflation on stable growth is consistent with the
idea that only extreme values of inflation matter, the threshold is not exceedingly high. Real
exchange rate overvaluation has a significant negative effect throughout the distribution,
but similarly to inflation, the effect is much more pronounced beyond the 88th percentile,
which is an overvaluation of 47%. The size of the government increases the chance of stable
growth; the estimates imply that going from 10% of government consumption in GDP to
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Figure 35: Probability of Stable Growth for the “median country”.
20% increases the long-run probability of stable growth from 40% to 60%. Finally, trade
lowers the probability of stable growth; quantitatively the estimates imply that increasing
the trade to GDP ratio from 36% to 96% results in the long run likelihood of stable growth
falling from 60% to 20%.
Figure 36 shows the probabilities of the miracle growth regime for a median country.
Income lowers the chance of fast growth reflecting convergence, but the effect is not very
large. As with stable growth, institutions have a positive effect, which again is steepest in
the middle of the distribution. Inflation matters only above the 88th percentile where it
lowers the chances of miracle growth. Real exchange rate overvaluation does not appear to
have a large effect. Government size significantly reduces the probability of a growth miracle;
increasing the share of government consumption from 10% to 20% reduces the probability
from 15% to only 5%. Finally, greater trade openness appears to increase the chances of a
growth take-off.
Note that in none of the boxes does the probability of miracle growth exceed 20%. In
fact, a hypothetical country with all the right-hand side variables set to the most miracle-
growth conducive values is predicted to spend 55% of time in miracle growth regime - below
actual values for countries like Hong Kong (72%) and Korea (86%). Of course, neither of
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Figure 36: Probability of Miracle Growth for the “median country”.
these countries had the hypothetical perfect policy mix, and consequently, the model predicts
they should spend even less than 55% of the time in miracle growth. We conclude from this
that while institutions and policy variables do affect the likelihood of miracle growth, there
are other factors at work (including possibly pure chance). This result mirrors the lack of
success of Hausmann and co-authors in explaining growth accelerations.
Several authors have investigated the relationship between the quality of institutions
and the effects of various other country characteristics on growth (e.g., Burnside and Dollar
2000, Serve´n et al. 2005). Aghion et al. (2004) show that the relationship between financial
openness and volatility may depend on the degree of development of financial markets, which
is presumably highly correlated with measures of institutions such as protection of property
rights - a part of the rule of law index.45 Here, because of the nonlinear nature of the
probability model, the effects of one variable depend on the level of the remaining variables.
The figure below shows plots of the miracle growth regime probabilities, calculated as above,
for two hypothetical economies: one with the sample’s highest value of quality of institutions
45Similarly, Aghion et al. (2008) provide a model and some evidence showing that the effects of fiscal
policy on growth again depend on the development of financial markets.
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(solid line) and another with the sample’s lowest (dashed line). All other variables remain
at the median level.
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Figure 37: Probability of Miracle Growth for good (solid line) and weak (dashed) institutions
countries.
Figure 37 compares the probabilities of the miracle growth state. The large gap between
the two lines indicates how much higher the probability of the miracle regime is for countries
with good institutions. With the exception of inflation, policies have very different effects
depending on the quality of institutions. Exchange rate overvaluation, which appears to
have no effect for countries with weak institutions, increases the chances of miracle growth
for countries with good institutions. The opposite is true for the size of government; while
it appears to have little effect when institutions are weak, it greatly reduces the likelihood
of fast growth where institutions are strong. Finally, trade does not affect the probability of
fast growth with weak institutions but greatly increases it with good institutions.46
46The main findings for other regimes are that: (1) greater share of government consumption in GDP
reduces the probability of stagnation for weak-institutions countries, while also increasing, albeit by much
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We can take the approach used to construct Table 18 and translate the effects in Figures
35 - 37 into effects on long run growth and volatility. First, let’s again consider a country
with all variables except that of interest set to the sample median (the “median country”)
without distinguishing between high and low quality institutions.
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0.01
0.012
0.014
0.016
0.018
0.02
Inflation
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0.01
0.012
0.014
0.016
0.018
0.02
Ex. Overvaluation
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0.01
0.012
0.014
0.016
0.018
0.02
Size of Governemnt
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0.01
0.012
0.014
0.016
0.018
0.02
Trade
Figure 38: Effects of policies on growth in the “median country”.
Figure 38 shows the effects of policies on long-run growth for the median country. Inflation
does not significantly affect growth as long as it remains below the 88th percentile or about
33%, however, instances of extreme inflation have a devastating effect on growth. Exchange
rate overvaluation, especially when it is extremely high, lowers growth. The size of the
government initially lowers growth and then raises it, but the overall effect is small. This is
a result of two offsetting forces affecting the median country. As government size increases,
the likelihood of miracle growth falls, however, so does the probability of stagnation, and
the probability of stable growth rises significantly. This suggests that otherwise identical
less, the chances of a crisis, (2) trade significantly increases the probability of a crisis but only for countries
with weak institutions, and (3) extreme inflation increases the chance of a crisis everywhere, but the effect
is much stronger with weak institutions.
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countries with different sizes of government may grow at similar rates, but the nature of the
growth process will be different. Countries with a lower size of government will go through
periods of stagnation but will also enjoy periods of fast growth. Countries with a higher size
of government are more likely to grow at moderate but uninterrupted rates.
Figure 39 shows the effect of initial income and quality of institutions. As could be
anticipated from the effects on regime probabilities, institutions have a stronger effect on
long-run growth than any of the policies examined in Figure 38. Note , however, that
the effect is greatest around the median of the quality of institutions distribution. While
the leveling off could well be expected at high levels of institutional quality, the relatively
smaller effect for low quality of institutions is not obvious. It suggests the existence of a
“threshold effect” with regards to institutions and casts doubt on the ability of incremental
improvements of institutions to generate sustained growth accelerations in countries with a
weak rule of law. A qualitative summary is presented in Table 19.
10th Percentile Median 90th Percentile
Inflation 0 0 −−
Real Exchange Overvaluation − − −−
Government Spending − − +
Trade − − −
Rule of Law + ++ 0
Initial Income + + 0
Table 19: Effect on long run growth at the 10th percentile, the median, and the 90th per-
centile of variables’ distribution. Effects are categorized as strongly negative (−−), negative
(-), negligible (0), positive (+), and strongly positive (++).
Figure 39: Effects of initial income and institutions on growth in the “median country”.
Figure 40 contrasts the long run growth effects of policies for countries with good (solid
line) and weak institutions(dashed line). The plots show growth relative to that of a country
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with all variables set to the sample median. Weak institutions appear to make economies
more vulnerable to the damaging effect of real exchange rate overvaluation and high inflation.
The size of government lowers growth for countries with good institutions in the entire range,
while for countries with weak institutions it lowers growth, albeit less strongly, below median
and raises it sharply above the median. As discussed above, this is a consequence of the
differential effect of government on the likelihood of stable growth versus miracle growth - it
increases the former while lowering the latter. For good-institutions countries, where stable
growth is the most likely regime this lowers average growth. However, for weak-institutions
countries, where stagnation dominates, stable growth is rare, and miracle growth is even
rarer, this raises growth.
Trade’s effect on growth also depends on institutions; it is positive when institutions are
good but turns strongly negative when they are weak. The beneficial effect of trade is to
increase the likelihood of miracle growth while the cost is the increase in the probability of a
crisis. The former effect is very strong with good institutions but virtually nonexistent with
weak ones (Figure 37). The latter, on the other hand, is insignificant for countries with good
institutions and quite strong for weak institutions.
These results, summarized in Table 20, suggest that the relationship between policies
and institutions is potentially quite complex and goes beyond the view that bad policies
are merely a manifestation of weak institutions, which are the ultimate determinants of
economic development as argued by Acemoglu et al. (2003). This is consistent with some
other recent findings. Fata´s and Mihov (2003) show that a country’s degree of discretionary
fiscal policy (measured by the unexplained variance from an estimated government spending
rule) is related to lax political institutions and is associated with lower growth and higher
GDP volatility. Cuberes and Mountford (2011) show that Fata´s and Mihov’s measure of
fiscal discretion is, in part, explained by historical variables. In particular, they argue that a
significant fraction of this ”discretionary” policy is indeed better attributed to institutional
quality. They then construct a tighter variable for fiscal discretion than the one explored in
Fata´s and Mihov (2003), i.e., the part of the unexplained variance of government spending
that is not accounted for by historical or geographical variables. Interestingly, they show
that even this, much tighter, measure of discretionary fiscal policy is negatively associated
with GDP volatility and growth. However, historical institutions also seem to have a direct
impact. Thus as in the above analysis, they conclude that while institutions are important
for growth and volatility, fiscal policy has an independent effect on growth performance.
Before concluding, we want to extend our analysis to include the effect of democracy
on regime switching. We do so because the strong and robust effect on growth reversals
reported above suggest the type of political institutions plays a role in growth transitions.
Introducing democracy into the analysis decreases the sample size somewhat so we decide
to treat this analysis in separation from the above main results.
The inclusion of democracy does not change the estimated effects of policies substantially
so we omit their exposition and focus on the effects of the rule of law, level of income and
democracy.47 Figure 41 below shows the estimated effects, evaluated at the median, of a
47One interesting change is that the effect of the rule of law on growth does not flatten out at high levels,
i.e., it goes from being S-shaped (see figures 35-36) to being J-shaped. It suggests that the flattening out
was a consequence of the correlation between democracy and the rule of law.
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Figure 40: Effects of policies on growth for good (solid line) and weak (dashed) institutions
countries. The vertical axis measures growth relative to an economy where all variables are
equal to the median.
one standard deviation change in initial income and the rule of law index from the model
without democracy (these are the same estimates as in Figure 34 and Table 18).
As discussed above, rule of law increases the probability of good regimes (miracle and
stable growth) while income increases the likelihood of stable growth and lowers that of
stagnation but also decreases the frequency of miracle growth (convergence effect). Figure
42 shows the effects in a model with democracy included among the explanatory variables.
Democracy increases the likelihood of stable growth and the estimated effects of rule
of law and income are now reduced. Democracy also slightly increases the probability of
stagnation and has a negative effect on the chance of a crisis that is similar in magnitude to
that of rule of law. Most importantly, however, democracy significantly lowers the likelihood
of miracle growth episodes. Furthermore, once democracy is accounted for, income has a
positive and small effect on the probability of a miracle take-off. That is richer countries are
less likely to grow rapidly because they are more democratic. This suggests that the conver-
gence effect uncovered before works mainly through the political economy channel and not
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10th Percentile Median 90th Percentile
Inflation Good Inst. 0 0 −
Weak Inst. 0 0 −−
Real Exchange Overvaluation Good Inst. 0 0 0
Weak Inst. − − −−
Government Spending Good Inst. − − −
Weak Inst. − 0 ++
Trade Good Inst. + + +
Weak Inst. − − −
Table 20: Effect on long run growth at the 10th percentile, the median, and the 90th
percentile of variables’ distribution; good institutions vs. weak institutions. Effects are cat-
egorized as strongly negative (−−), negative (−), negligible (0) , positive (+), and strongly
positive (++).
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Figure 41: Effects of a one standard deviation change in initial income and rule of law index
on long run regime probabilities. All right-hand side variables set to the sample median.
Model without democracy.
through standard channels such as diminishing marginal product of capital or technological
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Figure 42: Effects of a one standard deviation change in initial income, rule of law index
and democracy score on long run regime probabilities. All right-hand side variables set to
the sample median.
catch-up.48 This is consistent with the view of Olson (1982) who argued that democratic
societies may stagnate in the long run due to the detrimental effect of special-interest groups
which are able to organize and lobby for inefficient policies. Overall, the results imply that
democracy favors the middle at the expense of extremes - either very fast growth or severe
crises.
Overall the results of our investigation confirm some of the existing findings, namely
that institutional quality is a key determinant of long-run growth, as well as Easterly’s
finding that only extreme values of the distortionary policies (inflation rate and real exchange
rate overvaluation) have a significantly negative effect on growth. However, macro policies,
especially trade openness and the size of government also matter for changes in growth
patterns and thus influence the average growth and volatility in the long run. Crucially,
policies also differ in the channel through which they affect long-run growth. For example,
trade lowers the probability of stable growth and increases that of a crisis, while also making
miracle growth more likely. The size of government, on the other hand, lowers the chances
of miracle growth, while increasing the probability of stable growth at moderate rates. In
addition, the effects of policies depend in an important way on the quality of institutions.
In general, low quality of institutions makes economies more vulnerable to the harmful
effects of inflation and real exchange rate overvaluation. In some cases, the direction of the
effect is actually reversed; trade appears to be conducive to growth for countries with good
48Note that to the extent that Lipset hypothesis holds, i.e., democracy increases with income, this effect
will still lead to the standard convergence, whereby poor countries are catching up to the rich. However, see
Acemoglu et al. (2009) for evidence against the Lipset hypothesis.
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institutions and detrimental to growth for countries with bad ones. The size of government
has the opposite effect - it lowers growth when combined with good institutions and increases
it with weak institutions. Finally, when we extend the analysis to the effects of political
institutions by including a measure of democracy among the explanatory variables, we find
that similar to the rule of law, democracy increases the frequency of stable growth. Unlike
rule of law, however, democracy significantly lowers the chances of miracle growth takeoffs.
We also find that accounting for democracy removes the negative effect of initial income on
the probability of miracle growth, i.e., the convergence effect. This suggests that political
economy, in addition to diminishing marginal product of capital or technological catch-up,
is an important channel of convergence.
11 Conclusions
For most countries, economic growth is not a smooth process. It consists of periods of rapid
growth, stagnation, decline, and crises. While this has been known for almost as long as
the large cross-country data sets on output per capita have been available, only in the last
seven years have researchers began exploring the within-country variation in growth. In this
chapter, we have summarized these recent contributions. Following earlier papers, which have
documented growth variability and its lack of persistence, the latest papers try to identify
distinct growth patterns in the data and use them to learn about the nature of the process
of economic development. So far most work has focused on detecting turning points in the
growth process, instances when growth suddenly accelerates or falls for an extended time.
Various papers, using different methods, have detected the existence of growth accelerations
(and decelerations) – periods of sustained and unusually rapid growth (decline). The first
key finding is that such episodes appear ubiquitous among both rich and poor countries.
Unfortunately, in poor countries, the acceleration episodes tend to last shorter and are oftne
undone by subsequent periods of decline. This leads to two critical sets of questions: what
triggers growth accelerations? And what makes them sustained? Unfortunately, here the
literature has been less successful. Some factors that help ignite growth have been identified:
political transitions, economic reforms, and external shock all coincide with episodes of
growth acceleration. Total factor productivity, rather than investment in physical capital,
seem to be driving most accelerations. Finally, the degree of democracy appears to play
an important role in growth reversals, i.e., the episodes where a period of rapid growth
is undone by an equally dramatic decline. However, most episodes of growth acceleration
remain unexplained. Similarly, we still know relatively little about what sustains growth at
a high level once it accelerates. Several authors have come to the conclusions that the set of
factors responsible for igniting growth may be quite different from that which is responsible
for sustaining it, but we still do not have convincing evidence of what they are. There is
some indication that the quality of institutions, which has lately received enormous attention
in the growth literature, may play a more critical role in sustaining growth than in igniting
it in the first place but much more work is needed.
We devote considerable space to discussing the idea of modeling growth as a sequence
of transitions between different growth states. Initially proposed by Pritchett, this view
suggests it is useful to think of the economy as obeying different growth regimes over time.
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Following a growth acceleration, a country may look much like a Solow-model economy
growing rapidly due to the forces of convergence; however once a transition occurs, it may
resemble a poverty-trapped economy. The key question remains what triggers the transition
between growth regimes. However, unlike in the growth acceleration approach, there is room
for more diverse growth dynamics than just rapid growth or lack thereof. We discussed
attempts to implement this idea empirically and provided an extension of one of them.
Focusing on macroeconomic policies, we have found that once we allow for different growth
states, policies may have a very complex and subtle impact on growth. Some policies may
leave the average long-run growth unaffected by increasing the frequency of some growth
regimes but decreasing that of others. For example, we found that the size of government
spending reduces the frequency of both very rapid growth and large crises while increasing
that of stable but slower growth. The net effect, in the long run, is small but clearly, we
would not want to conclude that the size of government spending is irrelevant for the process
of growth.
We believe these results are interesting, but much more work remains to be done. We
see the research described above as only the beginning of a more ambitious research pro-
gram. Understanding economic growth in a country is an extremely complex issue, since
it necessarily implies dealing with not just the economics of the country, but also its po-
litical and institutional setup. Exploring within-country variation in growth gives us yet
more information from which to try to uncover the laws governing the process of growth.
Two key questions, from both an academic and a practical viewpoint: what causes growth
accelerations and what makes them sustained, still lack a satisfactory answers. All papers
discussed above shared the very limited success in explaining what causes economic growth
to accelerate suddenly. Jones and Olekn (2008) finding that accelerations appear to be pe-
riods of rapid TFP growth is not very comforting given our lack of understanding of what
TFP is. Similarly, while some progress has been made on understanding what distinguishes
sustained accelerations from unsustainable ones, we still know very little. Notice that our
reduced form analysis of regime switching is not very helpful here since we are not studying
the direct effect of policies on regime changes, but instead we ask what is their effect on the
long run distribution of the frequency of visits to each regime. This means that if we find that
a specific policy increases the fraction of time spent in a given regime, we will not be able to
tell whether this is because the policy increases the persistence of this regime or because it
makes the transition to that regime from other regimes more likely. Unbundling these effects
ia an essential next step for future research. We also believe that the link between political
institutions (democracy) and growth transitions is one where important contributions can
be made. The idea put forth by Rodrik (1999), that rapid growth may bring social conflict
which in the absence of democratic institutions turns to turmoil and growth collapse is an
intuitively appealing one, but more work is needed to establish its validity. More broadly,
the question of what policies outside the realm of the usual growth-promoting strategies help
sustain growth episodes seems worth exploring. Are there political or social arrangements
which do not play a direct role in economic growth but help sustain it? Finally, we would
like to emphasize the lack of a theory of growth transitions. Pritchett sketches out a model
of growth regimes, but despite a few interesting contributions, we do not yet have a plausible
theory of growth transitions.
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Our final thought is that after only several years, the research program focusing on the
within-country growth patterns has delivered some interesting and promising results but still
remains largely unexplored. We see this as a potentially very fruitful avenue of empirical
and theoretical research in economic growth.
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